Universal Rights, Non-Universal Process: Confronting Culturally Grounded Human Rights Abuses by Ramakrishna, Rushmi
f:' 
COMMENTS 
UNIVERSAL RIGHTS, NON-UNIVERSAL PROCESS: 
CONFRONTING CULTURALLY GROUNDED HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES 
R USHM I RAiV IAI<RISHNA" 
1. 1NT RODU CTIO N .... . ..... ... .......... ..... .... .. .... . .......... .................... . .... 1384 
2. THE POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
U SlN G IN TERNATIONA L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO COM BA T 
CULTURALLY GROUNDED HUMAN RIG HTS ABUSES .............. 1388 
2.1. Bwefits Enjoyed by Political Actors .. .... ....................... ...... 1390 
2.2. Costs facing Political Actors .... ................ ......... .................. 1393 
2.3. Benefits enjoyed by Judicial Actors .............................. .. ..... 1396 
2.4. Costs Facing Judges ............................................................. l398 
2.5. Sunzmary ..... ........... .......... ... .......... ... ........... .......... .. ... ......... 1400 
3. HONOR KILUNGS AND HONOR S UICIDES IN TURKEY: A 
CASE FOR AN INTER NATIONAL H UMAN RlGHTS 
APPROACH ........................ .. ..... . .... ........... . ...... .. .......... ... ............ 1401 
3.1 . Honor Killings and Honor Suicides ................................... 1401 
3.2. Honor Killings and Honor Suicides: Implicntions in 
International Human Rights Law .... ................................. 1405 
· J.D Candidate, 2009, University of Pennsylvzmi a Law Schoo l; M.A., 2006, 
The Johns Hopkins School of Ad va nced Interna tional Studies; B.A., 2005, The 
John s H o pkins University. The author would like to thank Pro fessor Stephen 
Burbank, Professor William Bur ke-Wh ite, Professor Tobie Meyer-Fong, Professor 
Ruth Wedgwood, and Professor Wil1icl 111 Zartm an for their guidance and 
inspiratio n; Erin Argueta and Erin Valentine for their feedback on ea rlier dra fts; 
the Un ive rsity of Pennsylvania Jou rnal of lntem ntionol Law for their final p o lish ing 
of this Comment; and the Ramakrislma s and the Bhaskarans fo r their support 
along the way. A ll errors are the au thor's. 
1383 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1384 U. Pn . f. In t'l L. [Vol. 30:4 
3.3. The Politicnl nnd judicial Advantages of an Intenll7tionnl 
Hunum 
Riglzts Approach 
to Combat Honor Killings cmd 
Honor Suicides in Turkey .... .... .......... .... ...... ... ... .. ..... ......... . 1407 
3.3.1. Pulitiml Benefits Outweigh th e Political Costs 
of Combating Honor Killings n11d Honor 
C • • i · • . 0 [ J · L107 
..JlllCli es 111 ur.::ey ·· ·· ················· ··· · ···· ··· ···· · · ······ A, 1 
3 .3 .2. judicio! Benefits Outweiglz th e judicial Costs 
of Combnting Honor Killings mzd Honor 
Sui cides in Turkey .. ....... .... .... .... ......... ... .. .......... 1410 
.3.4. Suillili!Ir}f . .. ...... .... .... . ...... . . ...... ... .. .. ..... .... ......... .. .. .. .. . .... .. .. . . . 1413 
4. FEMALE C LR CU MCISION IN LIBERIA: A CASE A C/\lN ST i\N 
I NTER NA TIONA L HUMAN RIGHTS APPROAC H ....... ... ..... .. ...... 1413 
4.1. Female Cirwmcision .. ... ..... ... ... .. ... ..... ... ..... .......... ........ ....... 1414 
4.2. Female Circwncision: Im plications i11 Iutcrnntionnf 
Human T<z ghts Law ... .................... .. ....... ... ... ... .... ... ............. 1418 
4.3. The Intemnticmal Human Rights Approach to Coill bn t 
Fe111al
e Circumcision 
in Liberia: A Politically and 
Judicially Costly Endeavor .. ............................. ............. .. ... . 1420 
4 .3 .1. Politics Cost Outrueigh Political Beu~fits in 
Combating Female Circumcision in Liberia ...... 1420 
4.3 .2. Judi cial Cos ts Outweigh th e Judi cial Benefits 
of Combating Female Circumcision in Liberia .. 1423 
4.4. Other Poten tial Avenues to Successfully Combat Fernnle 
Ci
rcumcis
ion in Lib eria .... ..... ... .... ... ...... .. .... ........ ........... ..... 1425 
4.5. Summary ... ........ ......... .... .. .. .... .. ........... .... ... ....... .. .. ... ... .. .... .. 1427 
5. CONCLUSION .. .... .. ................................................... ....... ...... .. ... 1427 
1. INTRODUCTIO N 
The use of international human rights law has developed 
rigorously since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
1-luman Rights .1 While several institutions of a. pur ely 
international character have normatively advanced and enforced 
principles of intern ational human rights law,2 domestic lega l 
' Sec Universa l Declaration of !-·Iuman Righ ts, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N . CAOR 
3d 5ess ., Jst plen. mt g., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (fmming the normative 
basis of the internationa l hum an ri ghts sys tem). 
2 Sec e.g ., Thomas Bu ergenthaL Tl 1c Euo /ui11g Intcrnntio!Iol HunuJJJ Ri ghts 
S1;stc111, 100 Arvl. J I~JT'L L. 783 (2006) (describing the deve lopment of the modern-
day international human rights system); Christopher J. Borgen, TraJJ sJwtio!Inl 
Tribu!Ials and th e Tmn:;111issi on f Norms: The Hegcii10ilY of Process, 39 C EO . WASH. 
[NT't L. REV. 685 (2007) (d iscuss ing norm transmission from international 
institutions to domestic systems); Andreas Mavrommatis, Solid Foundation s, i11 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/2
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spaces are fundamental areas in w hich interna tional human rights 
are actualized.3 Indeed, Eleanor Rooseve lt, champion of the 
Universa l Declaration, stated, "[u]nless these [human] rights have 
meaning [domestically], they have littl e meaning anywhere. "-! In 
domestic legislative settings, an " internati onal hum n rights 
approach" can include policymakers pursuing certain legislative 
TOWA RDS livii'LBviENTI NG UNIVERSAL HUM AN RIGHTS 73 (Nisuke Ando ed. , 2004) 
(desc ribing the ro le of the Huma n Rights Comm ittee in implementing the 
Internati
onal 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) 
:; See Anrw-iVIMie Slaughter & William W. Bu rke-White, Tlze F:tlure o( 
filtenwti ounl Lncu is Do111estic,L4 7 HArN. TNT'L L.J. 327, 350 (2006) ("More preci sely, 
the future of international law lies in its abilit y to affect, in flue nce , bolster, 
backstop, and even mandate specific ac to rs in d~1mestic poli tics. Inte rnational 
rules and institutions will and shou ld be designed as a set of spu rs and checks on 
domestic political actors to ensure that they clo w hat they shou ld be doing 
anyway, that is, what they have already commi tted to do in their domestic 
cons ti tutions and laws."); Richard B. Lillich, T111: Role of Do111estic Court::; in 
Enforcing Jnternntionn/ Humnn Ri glzt s L w, in C UIDE TO lNTERN/\TlO\IA L HUMAi' J 
RIGHTS PRACTICE 22 3, 228 (Hurs t Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992) ("A lthou gh 
'[i ]nternational human rights law is derived from a variety of sources and 
involves any kinds of materials, both international and natio na l' ... it is to 
national law that one must look first to determine the scope and content of human 
rights recognized and protected in any cou ntry. Domestic courts confronted with 
human rights claims initially refer to national cons titutions, la ws, d ecrees, 
regulations, court and administrative decisions, and policy pronouncements for 
relevant ru les of d ecision. Increas ingly, however, domestic courts are taking 
international human rights law into account in deciding cases.") (internal citation 
omitted); see, e.g.. I van Shearer, Tl1e Do111estic Applimtion of the Covennn t in 
Australia, in TOWARDS IMPLEME NT ING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGH TS, supra n ote 2, at 
251, 251 - 62 (describing the application of the Interna tional Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights in Austra lia, a common law system); Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 
42, §§ 1-22 (U.K.), avnilablc nt http: / jwwvv.opsi. gov uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga 
_19980042_en_1 (implementing the United Kingdom's human rights obligations 
under the European Conven tion on Human Rights in the United Kingdorn); 
Torture Vic tims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340- 2340A (2006) (implementing 
U.S. ob ligations under the Convention Agains t Torture by establishing liability for 
individu als who commit torture or extrajudicial ki lling); Loi de 16 juin 1993 
relative a Ia repression des infractions graves aux Conventions internationals de 
Genere du 12 aon 1949 ct aux Prot ocoles I ct II du 8 juin 1917, additionneles aces 
Conventions [Ac t Concerning th e Punishment of Grave Breaches of Internationa l 
Humanitarian Law ], Jun. 16, 1993 (Belg.), tmuslnt ed iu 38 T.L.M. 921 (1999) 
(providing Belgium co urts w ith jurisdiction to entertain criminal cla ims initi a ted 
by private citizens for vio lations of the Geneva Conventions, genocide, and 
torture). See o/so Universi ty of Nottingh am, Human Rights Law Centre, Database 
of National !rTtplementing Legislation, http:/ jwww.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc 
/ interna tional-crimina !-jus tice-unit/ implementa tion-cia tabase.php (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2009) (p roviding a list of countries w ith domestic legislation tha t 
implements the Rome Statu te of the International Criminal Court). 
·l NIHAL JAYAWI CKRAMA, THE JUD ICIAL APPLICATIO N OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND lNTERNATIONAL JUr<ISPRUDENCE 95 (2002). 
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goals by ex plicitly invoking their country's international hum.an 
rights obligations in policy debates. Even m ore directly, the 
political s trand of the interna ti ona l human rights approach wo uld 
involve enacting implementing legisl ation to effec tuate 
international human rights obliga tions. From a judic ia l 
perspective, an i11terna.tional human rights approach has tvvo 
strands . On one level, judges can ci te foreign or inte rnational 
hurnan rights decisions to buttress argu men ts, although not as a 
binding or persuasive source of legn! material tha t cornpels the 
restd t. The other s trand involves, more contentiou s ly, the use of 
fo reign or international human rights decisions a.s au thori ta. ti ve 
tex ts that might compel the result in a case.5 
Female circumcision,6 the prac tice of cutting parts of the fen1ale 
geni
talia 
in a rite-of-passage ceremony, is a common practice 
throughout AfricaJ In parts of the Middle Eas t, honor killings and 
honor suicides have resulted in hundreds of women being k ill ed or 
press ured to commit suicid e to atone fo r perceived sins of sexual 
m;:dfeasan ce8 vVith respect to these culturally grounded human 
rights abuses,9 the political and judicia l effec tiveness of using an 
international hu man rights approach is :cot cost-11.eutral. Female 
circumcision, honor killings, and suicides contra vene fundamental 
princip les enshrined in international human rights law; as a. result, 
the illegality of these practices under international human rights 
la w gives judges and p oliticians a choice . They can explicitly seek 
to invoke those obligations (the interna tion al human rights 
approach), or they can combat the practices without usin g the 
" This deba te has been pa rticul arly prono unced in the Unit ed States lega l 
syst
em 
Sec Ken !. Kersch, Tl 1c New Lc<~a/ Tmll SJlilliunnlislll, tl1e G/ohlli zc d ]udicinnJ, 
n;u1 tl1c Rule ol Low, 4 WAS I-l. U. G L OGA L,STUD . L. REV. 345 (2005) (noting the conce1:n 
and deba te surrou nding some Supreme Court justices' approac h to citing 
interna tiona 1 pre~cti ces ); Ma rk C. Re~hdert, Ctnn po rn tiuc Con sti tu tiuno/ A dvococy, 56 
Alvl. U. L. REV . 553 (2007) (focusi ng on the debate between the Am erican insula ri ty 
and prospec ts for change); RICHARD A. POSNE I\, Ho w jUDGES TH INK 347- 49 (2008) 
(disc ussing the deba te e~bou t whether the Supreme Court sho uld cite foreign or 
internat iona l decisions) . 
" See in_ti-n note 139 (discuss ing the au thor' s usc of the term fema le 
circumc is ion as opposed to other terms, such as fema le gen ital mutibti on, that 
hcwc been u sed to describe the p rac tice at issue) . 
This p ractice will be described m.ore full y in_ti·n Sec tion 3.1. 
~ This p racti ce ;viii be described more fully infra Sec tion 4.1. 
9 By "cul turally grou nded h uman rights abuses," I m ean pr0ctices tha t are 
loosely just ified by norms deem ed <Kceptable or true by som e subset of tha t 
culture. 
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body of interna tional hmnan rights lavv. JO Unlike other areas of 
human rights abuses and violations,11 the use of human rights law 
does not necessarily provide sufficient political or judicial benefits 
that outweigh its costs to political and judicial actors seeking to 
end such practices . In son-. e instances, an international human 
rights approach tnay reduce the political and jud icial costs of 
confronting culturall y grounded human rights abuses by 
ex ternalizing the obligation to do so.12 On the other hand, the 
invocation of human rights la w for the purpose of eradicating such 
practices may increase political and judicial costs re lative to its 
benefits by importing non-local normative biases into the political 
and judicial debate. 13 Plain and simply, international human r ights 
norms are universal. However, the process for implerncnting these 
norms is not. 
This Comment develops a theoretical framework underlining 
the judicial and political cos ts and benefits of using an 
international human rights approach to combat culturally 
grounded human rights abuses and applies this framework to the 
politics of eradicating honor killings and suicides in Turkey and 
female circumcision in Liberia. In doing so, this Comment 
separates the analysis of the applicability and universality of 
human rights norms in the context of culturally grounded human 
rights abuses from the implementation strategies of con1bating 
those practices. This Comment argues that although international 
human rights norms are universally applicable, the appropriate 
implementation process of eradicating culturally grounded abuses 
1u This Comment is not primarily concerned \,vith why such practices violate 
human rights la vv, but ra ther w ith vvhat relevance human rights law has in 
combating these practices. Therefore, this Comment assumes tha t the cultura ll y 
grounded human rights abuses addressed herein violate international human 
rights norms . It provides brief discussions of these issues in sections 3.2 and 4.2, 
iufra . For a d iscussion on the applicabili ty, or iack thereo f, of international human 
rights law to non-western cul tural practices, see Jerome j. Sbes tack, Glubaliza tion of 
Humau Ri g/its, 21 FORDHA!v! JNT' L L.J. 558, 567-68 (1997) (describing and attacking 
cultural re la tivism arguments). 
1 i See Buergenthal, supra note 2, a t 791, 802 (expl aining the effec tiveness of 
the international legal system in com ba ting human rights v iola tions, vvar crimes, 
and crimes against humanity). 
12 See iufra Sec tion 3 (describing hovv the interna tional human rights 
approach is cost-effective in Turkey, with respect to responding to honor killings 
and honor suicid es). 
n Sec iufra Section 4 (describing how the international human rights 
approach is not cos t-effecti ve in Liberia, \,v ith respec t to eradicating female 
circumcision) . 
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1s not. Certain conditions, such as a country's amenability to 
joining international regimes, the prevalence of the culturally 
grounded huma n rights abuse, the political strength of 
cons tituencies tha t support the prac tice and the stability of 
domestic political institutions, w ill significantly alter the cos t-
benefit analys is of the international human rights approach . l-1 
Therefore, under certa in conditions, an international human rights 
approach can help p o litical and judicial actors decrease and 
ex ternalize costs of comba ting culturally grounded human rights 
abuses. Under othe r conditions, an international human rights 
approach to combat a culturally grounded human rights abu se can 
be politically and judicially costly relative to its benefits. 
Section 2 of this Conunent develops a fr amework to ana lyze 
the political and judicial costs and benefits of th e intcrna tional 
human rights approach to combat culturally ground ed human 
rights abuses. Sec tion 3 applies the analy tical framework to honor 
killings in Turkey and argues that an international human rights 
approach can help decrease and externalize the costs of eradicating 
honor killings and honor suicides. Section 4 applies the analytical 
framework to female circumcision in Liberia and argues that 
human rights law will likely increase the costs of combating fema le 
circumClslOn w ithout providing significan t benefits to outweigh 
those costs. 
2. THE P OUT ! CAL AND JUDICI AL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF US ING 
INTERNATI ONAL H Ui'v !AN RIGHTS L AW TO COMBAT CULT URALLY 
GROUNDED 
H UMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES15 
The political and judicial use of an international hun1<m ri ghts 
approach to interpre t individual rights within a cultural contex t in 
domestic settings is not cost neutral.1 6 In dualist states,l 7 the 
14 It is beyond the scope of this Comment to outline all such factors tha t may 
amplify or minimize po li tica l and judicia l cos ts associa ted with an in ternationa l 
hu man rights approach. The goa l of this Comment, however, is to identify those 
cos ts and benefits, and illustrate their calculations in the Liberian and Turkish 
contexts. 
15 This section cl rcnvs from a variety of sources to es tablish an analytica l 
framework. Poli tica l cos ts and benefits are derived from recent experiences in 
international affairs and politi cal sc ience. Judicial costs and benefits are reasoned 
from theories on the separation of povvers and concepts derived from the 
emerging literature on judicial behavior. 
16 David Kenn edy, The Disciplines of Intemationa/ Law and Policy, 12 LEJDEN J. 
lNT' L L. 9, 16-1 7 (1999) (viewing "contemporar y international law as a modernis t 
cultural production"). 
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proscriptions that internationa l human ri ghts law has against 
human rights abuses do n ot, in most cases, reside in the self-
executing portions of human rights trea ties. 1S As a result, domes tic 
legisla tures nmst actively enact legislation that criminalizes certain 
practices in order to effectuate fully the scope of legal obligations 
under human rights treati es.19 Even in the more monist leaning 
legal systems, the invocation of international human rights law 
imports non-local nonnative biases into the legal and political 
discourse. When ques tions of culture are debated, then, this non-
local nonnative bias w ill not go unnoticed. 2o Therefore, in the 
range of dualist and monist legal systems, the use of international 
human rights law on questions of individual righ ts and culture 
will likely create some political and judicial friction, positive or 
negative .21 
17 In a dualist state, the s tate mus t take national measures ("an act of 
transformation") in ord er to execute international law. In a monist state, 
interna tional law is autom aticall y incorporated into the domes tic la w corpus. Sec, 
e.g., John Jackson, Stntus of Treaties iu Do111cstic Legnl Syste111s: A Policy Annlysis, 86 
AM. J. IN"T'L L. 310 ("1992) (exp laining the domes tification process of international 
treaties and its policy implications) . 
IS Granted, while the executive branch often accepts the obliga tions 
contained in an international human rights law, the obligations belong to the 
state, which includes all branches of gove rnment. See ]AYAWICKRAM A, supra note 
4, at 96-97 ("It can hardly be argued that the legislature and the judiciary of a state 
party to a human rights trea ty are free to ignore or dec ide not to give effect to, its 
provis ion. The commitment is made by 'the s tate' which, in this context, must 
mean all three branches of government.") 
19 See , e.g., Philip Als ton, A Fralllework fo r the Co111pamtiu e Analysis of Bill of 
Rights, ill PROMOTIN G H UMA N RIGHTS TI-IImUGH BI LLS OF RIGHTS: COlvlPARATIV E 
PER
SP
ECT IVES 1, 2 (Phi lip Alston ed., 1999) (no ting a "trend towards universal 
recognition of human rights in d omestic constitutional law"); Li llich, suprn note 3, 
at 230 (noting tha t the "human rights clauses of the UN Charter are non-self-
executing and hence vest no enforceable rights to indi viduals" in the U.S. court 
sys tem) . 
20 Kennedy, supro note 16, at 17. 
21 See , e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Swiug Shift, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, :W05, a t 42 
rruailable at http:// www.newyorker.com/ archive/ 2005/09 /12/050912fa_fact 
(describing the controversy created by Jus tice Anthony Kenn edy's international 
and foreign lm-v re ferences in indi vidual liberties opiniorts); Ada m Liptak, Sup rem e 
Court's G/ oballuj7u eucc is VVoniu g, N.Y. TiiviES, Sep t. 18, 2008, at A1 (di scussing the 
controversy of citing foreign or international law d ecis ions in the United Sta tes); 
Appropriat e Role of Fo reign Judgnz e11ts iu tlze ln te1pretatiou of J\meriwu Lnw: Hearin g 
on H.R. 568 Before 1/zc Subco nn11 . on t!zc Constitution of t!ze H. Co nm1. on tlze Judiciary , 
108th Cong. 10 (2004) (s ta tement of Jeremy Rabkin, Professo r of Government, 
Cornell University) (arguing that "[a]ppeals to fore ign practice tend to undermine 
the notion that w e [the United States] really do (or rea lly should) have a distinct 
constitution in our own country") [here inafter Foreign Judgments]. 
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2.1. Benefits Enjoyed by Political Actors 
An international human rights approach n1ay allow political 
and judicial actors to ex ternalize the costs associa ted with 
confro nting cultu rally gro unded hun< an rights abuses, thus 
yielding ne t benefits. First in ternational human rights trea ties can 
serve as a precommitment to certain lega l obliga tions,22 allowing 
political actors to buckpass to the internat ional community such 
obligations to confront abu ses n Essentially, political actors are in 
a position to rely on, and perhaps even complain about the 
international human rights position and the obliga tory effect of 
internation al law, while still enjoying a desired policy outcome. 
This tendency to buckpass unpopular policy decisions onto 
in terna tional norms and ac tors is probabl y most pronounced in the 
era of Washington Consensu s Interna tional Monetary Fund 
(" IMF") reform packages/4 in which political ac tors instituted 
unpopular economic policy for economic stabiliza tion, but 
attempted to externalize the onus of responsibility to an 
international actor. 25 In the human rights realm, Joseph Kabila, the 
president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has arguably 
externalized the cosf26 of addressin g human rights violations 
22 See Steven Ra tner, PrccOIIllllifment Theory nnd lntemntionnl Lnw: Star ting 11 
Conuer:ontion, 8'1 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2057 (2003) ("The theory of precommitment 
offers a framework for understanding the reasons that, an d the methods by 
which, individ uals and communities seck to bind themselves in the sense of 
preventing themselves from having full li berty of action a t a time in the future. ") 
23 See id. a t 2072 
[S]ome s ta tes presumably ente r in to human rights treat ies because they 
rea lly do w ish to tie their hands for fea r of the consequences of their later 
choices. The treaty, as a promise to others, increases the costs to them of 
changed behavior. A cl ear exa mpl e woul d incl ude s tates in transition 
fro m autocracy to democracy that \van t to lock in human rights 
commitments as a way to overcome tem pta tions by future governments 
to renew human rights abuses. . . Indeed, vvithin societ ies that have less-
than-ideal human rights records, NGOs push for accession to the treaty 
as a form of precommi tment. 
2-1 Sec LOUIS vV. PAUI.Y , WH O EL ECT ED THE B1\ Nl<FRS7 79-130 (1997) (describing 
JMF in terven tions and the <ls sociated political issues) . 
25 See, e.g., Kenneth Rogoff, The [;'v!F Strikes Back, Forme"! PoL'Y, Jan. / Feb. 
2003, at 33, 39 (describing that the llv!F, "slammed by antigloba list protesters, 
developing-country politicians, and Nobel Pri ze-winning economis ts ... has 
become Global Scapegoa t Number One"). 
26 These cos ts could include any peace tradeoffs associated w ith prosecuting 
individuals in the turbu lent confl ict, alienating the constituencies of the groups 
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during Congo' s civil w ar by inviting the International Criminal 
Court (" lCC") to investigate human rights viola tions in Congo27 
Likewise, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda sought to 
externalize his human rights problen1s vvith respect to the Lord' s 
Resistance Army by inviting the ICC to inves ti gate potential 
violations of the Rom.e Statute.2s Thus, K;_"'bi la and Museveni were 
able to rely on an international ins titution to buckpass the costs of 
confron ting politically contentious domesti c issues. 
Second, po litical actors confronting contentiou s cultural 
practices ma:v have a limited domestic support base to enact their 
policies .29 Politica l actors implementin g in tern ational human 
rights l2vv or promoting human r ights generally attrac t a 
community of international organizat ions, d onor agencies, and 
non-governmen tal organizations ("NGOs"), vv hich ar c financed 
and willing to suppor t political actors who further the 
actualization of international human rights law .3° As a result, these 
pohtical ac tors, by implementing or prom oting interna tional 
human rights norms to comba t culturally grounded human rights 
abuses, are able to leverage the support of the in ternational human 
bac king peq.,e trat ors o f w ar crimes, and the log istiec1l issues arising from high -
pro file war crimes prosecutions. 
27 Thierry Cru veillie r, ICC jo ins t 1c Collgolcsl' Chess CnJII I', Il\!T 'L} L'S T. TRIB.,Jul y 
5, 2004, http: / I www.justicetribune.com l indcx.php7page=v2_article&id=2697 
(l as t vi si ted Mar. 17, 2009) . 
2s Sec Ka
saija P
hi llip Apuuii , The ICC's Poc:si[;/c O,:ferrul of the LRA Case to 
Uganda, 6 J. [l'H'L C Rii'v!. jUST. 801, 802 (2008) (d esc ribing Mu sev eni's motivation for 
initiatin g Uganda' s sel f-re ferral to the fCC); \tVi !liCJm A. Schabas, Co111plementaritl{ 
i11 Prncticc: Crcatiue SrJ/utioJI S or 11 Trap for tl1c Co: u"f? , in THE INTERNA TIONAL 
CR
IMIN
AL COU RT AND NATIONAL j UR ISDI CTIONS 36 (Ma u ro Politi & Federica Giora 
eds ., 2008) (descr ibing M use veni's buckpassin g to the ICC) . 
29 This is partic ularl y so in countries that s u ffer from the so-ca lled " cultur e of 
impunitv,'' i.n w hich o o liticai constituents would much ra th er avoid confronting 
vio latiot;s and maint~ining the st atus quo . See, c g, H.P. vVolokol ie and Sand~ 
Moore, Tile Onlt; Prullli ll Cilt Culture l  Libcrio in Rcccut Times i.e Tile Culture Of 
llllp111 1i
ty, Snys 
1\eu . Fr. C!1ri stoph er Kei Ka ndakni, Retin.' d Ep iscopL71 Pr iest, D A ILY 
OBSEINER, Jul y 15, 2006, lTi.>nilnh/e nl h ttp:/ lwvvw.libc ri <mobserver.com l nevvs 
I fu ll sto ry. php I aidi37661 The_Only _Promi ncn t_ Cul tu rc_In_ Liberia_ ln_Recent_ T 
imes_ ls_The_C u lture_Of _Im puni ty.html ; Amnesty Jn t'l, Turkey: Tile Entrenclied 
Culture o{lrnpuuity ;\ilu sl E111i, EUR -!4 /014120 07, juiv 5, 2007 (discussing the 
pe rsis ting imou n itv in Turkev for g rav e huma n right s vio le1 tion s and the d ifficu ltv 
of refo rmin g ~ys t e(11ic fbw s).- L ' 
3tJ Sec, e.g., Peter va n TuijL Entering ti1e GloLh71 Oe17iing Roo111 : 1\~flecliolzs 011 o 
1\igllts-Boscd Fmlllt:U'O rk _t[n· NGOs in lnlcrnntionnl Developllle ut, 21 THI RD Wm:LD Q. 
617, 617 (2000) (descr ibing tha t "the human r ights framework cuts across d ifferent 
as pects o f d evelopment[J ... w hich is increasingly suppo rted by a stronger sociaL 
political an d cul tura l global rootin g ."). 
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rights communit y in the context of a limited do mestic support 
base .Jl 
For example, interna tional organizations and d iplomatic 
efforts, through their p rogramming and fund in g efforts, have 
provided suppor t (and pressure) to p olitical actors who are in a 
posi tion to affect policy outcomes related to hu rna n righ ts 
implem entation . The Unit ed States government has conditi oned 
assistance on basic human rights and good governance stan da rds.31 
In tenTlS of donor agencies, the United Stat es Agency fo r 
Internati onal Development ("US AJD") provides funds and 
program m.ing assistance to ministries of ju s tice im plen1.entin g 
genocide laws and under-resou rced court systen1s thrn u gh its 
Transition Initiative33 In Zimb abw e, the United States suppor ted 
local parlian1enta. rians in forging a strong opposition to Robert 
Muga.be' s governme nt."' The United Kingdom Fore ign and 
Commonwealth Office's Global Opportunities Fund ("GOF" ) 
manages a £2.7 million budget fo r human righ ts rela ted 
31 See, e.g, Human Righ ts Wa tch, Abou t Us, http:/ jwwvv .hrw.orgjabou t/ 
(las t visited Ma r. 17, 2009) (sta ting that Human Rights Wa tch "vvork[s] tenaciously 
to lay the lega l and moral groundwork fo r deep-rooted change and has fou ght to 
bring greater justice and secu rity to people around the vv orl d"); Center fo r 
Reproductive Rights, A bout Us, http:j jwww.rep roductiverights.o rg/about.h tml 
(las t visited Ma r. 17, 2009) (sta ti ng tha t the Cen ter for Rep rodu cti ve Rights " uses 
the law to advance reproductive freedom as a fund amenta l human right tha t a ll 
governments are lega ll y obligated to pro tec t, respect, and fu lfill" ). 
32 For exa mple, the U.S. Congress passed laws requiri ng some governmen t 
assista nce to be el imin ated if the receiving country has engaged in se riou s h uma n 
rights viol at ions. Sec Foreign Assi s tance Act of 1961, P ub. L. No. 87- 195 
§ 502B(a)(l) (s tating tha t "a principa l goal of the foreign policy of the Uni ted 
Sta tes shall be to promote the increased observance of inte rna tiona ll v recogn ized 
hu ma n ri gh ts by all cou ntri es,"); id. § 5025(a) (2) (" Except u nde r circu mstances 
spec ified in this section, no secur ity assistance may be p rovided to any count ry 
the governmen t of w hi ch engages in a consis tent pa ttern of gross \'to!ation s o f 
in ternationa ll y recognized h uman righ ts."). See genern!l t; Joh n Shattuck, Diplomacy 
cL'i lh a Cause: Hunwu FU~;Izt~ in US Forci.;; u Po!iCI;, in REALI ZIN G H UMA N RIGHTS: 
MOVIN G FROM l NSPIRAT I~N TO livtPACT 23S (Samant ha Powe r & Craham All ison 
ed s., 2000) (desc ribin g the Un ited States' hu man rights policies from the Vietnam 
War to the Clinton Adm inistration) . 
3J Uni ted States Agency for International Development , OTI Special Focus 
l\rt!tl: Judicial Hunzmz 1-Usilt s Prt1ccsscs, http: / jwww.usaid. govjou r_work/cross 
-cu tti ng_progra ms/ trans ition_ini tiatives / focus/ hu mright .h tml (la st visited fvlct r . 
26, 2009) . 
3-l 
Uni ted 
States Department of State, Suppo rtiug Hu m1111 Rigizts 1111d Ocnzocrncy: 
The US Record 2006, ht tp: / jw-vvvv.s ta te gov/g/ drl / rls/s h rd/2006/80586. h tm 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2009) . 
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programrning3s GOF programming includes support to 
government efforts to improve access to information in [ndia, 
providing capacity to support the Brazilian criminal jus tice system, 
and improving judicial professionalism in China .36 These few 
examples highli ght the tools and fin ancial support provided by 
human rights-minded governments to political actors committed 
to implementing their international human rights obligations. 
Interna tional NCOs, furthermore, help protect local activists 
w ho seek to confron.t human rights abuses. Because local ac tors 
confronting abu ses often face significant threa ts of reprisal and 
vio lence, interna tional human rights organiza tions "place their 
highest priority on tryin g to protect the local human rights activ is ts 
w ho are on the front line. "37 Furthermore, interna tional NCO 
partnerships with local ac tivists helps connect those ac tivities with 
a network of international human rights activists and the 
international press, further providing a community of support for 
those activists fac ing resistance 3s 
2.2. Costs Fncing Pol iticnl Actors39 
An international human rights approach, howevec carries with 
it several cos ts tha t may make political actors hesitant to employ 
the approach. For poli tical actors, using human rights law as a 
means to combat an abuse grounded in cultural norms can alienate 
politicians from their cons tituents and undermine future election 
prospects.40 Attempting to combat human rights abuses grounded 
35 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Global Opportu nities Fu nd, 
http:/ j collec tions.europarchive.org/ tna/ 200 80205132101/ www.fco.gov.uk 
j servlet/ Front%3fpa gename=OpenMa rket/ Xcele ra te/ Show Page&c= Pagc&cid 
=1177937028469 (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) . 
36 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, GOF Hu111an Rigl1ts Prognmuu e -Proj ct 
Portfolio (2007/2008), http: / jwww.fco.gov.uk/Filesjk£ile/UNCL%2007-08 
%20GOF %20 H R %20Projec t%20Por tfolio,O .pdf. 
37 Kenneth Rot h, Hunum Riglzts Organ izations : A New Fo rce for Social Change, in 
REALIZING HUM AN RIGHTS: MOVI NG FROM IN SPIRATION TO IM PA CT 225, 235 
(Samantha Power & Graham Allison cds.). 
3S Td. 
JCJ The fo llowing section lis ts vari ous cost argumen ts tha t have been rai sed in 
the relevant literature. Adm.ittedly, each of th e argl1ments is subject to norma tive 
a ttack. However, the purpose of this secti on is to id entify reasons for poli tica l 
hesitancy in implementing human rights law. 
~ll See geuerally David P. Quintal, The Theory of Electoral Systems, 23 POL. RES. 
Q. 752, 755 (1970) (arguing that political actors must consider "costs of voter 
affect" which are incurred when " the electorate views the action as a cabal" and 
thus hold the government "responsible a t the polls" ). 
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in cultural norms opens politicians to attacks of being overly 
//Western." This constraint is particularly evident in societies with 
strong anti-western sentiment where the label of //Western 
syn1pathizer" is politically deadly. For example/ the 2005 Arab 
Human Development Report describes that: 
[M]any Arabs ... stigmatize the endeavour to liberate 
vvomen as a task taken fron1 the agenda of Western 
imperialism and to demean those who call for it as 
creatures of the West. Moreover, foreign calls for reforrrt, 
even if by force if necessarv, have also created a backlash 
" ~ 
against Arab models for the rise of women, vvhich have 
been bracketed with outside initiatives considered to 
encroach on Arab culture and sovereignty.-!1 
The Arab Development report encapsulates the political costs 
associated with applying Western notions of justice to culturally 
sens1t1ve issues. Not only does the approach solicit attacks of 
Western imperialism, but it also discredits homegrown domestic 
efforts to implement human rights norms. Therefore, because an 
international human rights approach is inextricably attached to the 
\!\Test, its international institutions, and its governments, the 
approach itself is prone to anti-Western attacks. 
In addition, using an international human rights approach to 
combat human rights abuses grounded in cultural norms can 
amplify the costs of implementing international law.-f2 In 
legislative systems that disfavor laws purporting to exist above 
domestic legislation (such as the United States),43 such 
implementation efforts are costly. For example, under the United 
~1 UNITED NATIONS 0EV. PROCRAMME, REC;'L l3Uli.EAU FOR ARAB STATES & ARAB 
FUND FOR ECON. AND Soc. DEV., THE ARAG HU'viAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: 
TOWARDS THE RISE OF WOMEN IN THE ARAB WORLD 62 (2005). 
42 The legislative process produces political costs at multiple points. Internal 
decision-making costs refer to the political costs of gaining consensus to support a 
legislative action. In countries without a party in the majoritv, these costs are 
higher. Minority parties opposed to the legislative action may also make the 
proposed legislative action costly, by delaying motions, calling for further debate, 
and hamstringing the overall legislative process. Political actors must also 
consider information costs, referring to the calculations that need to be made as to 
the political consequences of supporting the proposed legislative action. See 
Quintal, supro note 40, at 753-56. 
43 See Jackson, supra note 17, at 323 ("[I]t is sometimes argued that urging the 
direct application of treaties is tantamount to 'interference in the internal affairs' 
of a sovereign state."). 
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States Cons titution, the president has the power, " by a nd w ith the 
advice <::llld consent of the Sen a te, to make treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur." 44 This arrangement crea tes 
two areas of political pressures in implementing international 
i <:nv- in the executive and the legislative. Both the President and 
the Senate must be prepared to fight on the side of international 
lavv in an arena hostile to international 1aw.45 For contentious 
issues, political ac tors may not wish to expend val uable political 
capit a l in such circu mstances. In Europe, the recen t rejection of the 
Europecl n Constitution demonstrates the political cos ts of attaching 
to supranational idea ls. For example, Jacques Chirac suffered 
blows to hi s political capital when France emphatically rejected the 
Europ e<:l n Cons tituti on .46 Throughout Africa, Frans Viljoen and 
Lirette Lou w have found state compliance with the Banjul human 
rights sys tem lacking for the most part.47 In thirty percent of the 
cases the author s considered, state parties did not comply with the 
Commission's recommendations. In another thirty-tw o percent of 
cases, s tate parties only partially complied vvith the 
recommendations:~s The authors argue that" [i]nadeguate political 
cormnitment at the regional level is an important factor underlying 
the lack of state compliance with the recommendations of the 
~~ US. CONST. a rt. ll § 2. 
15 In the US. context, a prime example of the contentiousness of 
implem e nti ng new in terna tional law obligations is President Cl inton 's signing of 
the Rom e Statute, fo llowed by Congress' and the Bush Adminis tration 's later 
rej ection of it. Sec gc ncml/y THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONA L CRIMINAL 
COURT: NAT IO:'\'AL SECUR ITY AND INTE RNATIONAL L AW (Sarah B. Sewall & Car[ 
Kaysen ed s ., 2000) (o ffe ring variou s arguments highlighting the contentious ness 
o f the In te rnational Cri min a l Cour t in the United Sta tes) ; Dav id Sch effer, Richard 
Cooper & Juliette Vo inov Kohler, The End of Excep tional ism in War Crimes: The 
In
tern,ztional Crilllinal Court 
and A111eri ca's Credibility in the World, H ARV. INT'L REV., 
Nov. 2 1, 2007, http: / jwww.harva rd ir .org/articles/ 1647/ (describing the his tory 
of the Rome Statute and the political contentiousn ess of the ICC in the United 
States). 
~" Sec Cra ig Whitlock, Fm nce Rejects Europemz Constitution, THE W.AS HI NGTON 
PosT, Mav 30, 2005, a t Al , available at http: / jwww.washing to npost. com/wp 
-d vn / co nten t/ article/ 2005/ 05 / 29 j AR2005052900644 .html (reporting tha t 
Cl;ira c's "already wea k political s tanding was hur t even more by the referendum 
res u Its" ). 
·>7 Fra ns Viljoen & Lire tte Lo uw, Stllte Compliance with the Rec ommendations of 
tlw Ati·ican Conuniss i on 011 Hu nwn and Peop les' Riglz ts, 1994-2004, 101 AM .]. TNT' L L. 
1, S (2007) . For an explana tion of the Banjul Sys tem , see Li-a nn Tho, Battling 
Bnlkaui
zatio
n: Regional App ronclies Toward Min ority Protection Beyo nd Europe , 43
HARV. l l\.'T'L. L. J. 409, 415- 16 (2002). 
~o Vi lj oen & Low.-v, supra note 47, a t S-6. 
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Comm ission a t the macrolevel. "-19 This conclusion further 
highlights the political difficulty and the associated costs of 
incorporating supranational norms in domes tic political systems. 
2.3. Benefits Enjoyed by judicial Actorsso 
For judicial ac tors, international hum.an rights la vv can be 
beneficial in confronting culturally grounded human rights abuses. 
The use of international human rights law in such se ttings imports 
the benefits of persuasive authority to buttress human rights 
claims; this, in turn, helps judiciaries overcome the cost of 
confronting thorny lega l issues. Judges in several countries have 
used an international human rights approach to confront practi ces 
w ithin their cou n try that violate human rights law. Therefore, 
judicial actors can rely on human rights law even if dornest!c 
legislatures have no t trea ted, or have negatively trea ted, a 
cultura lly grounded human rights abuse. 
When judicial actors search for persuasive authority, global 
norms and interna tional judicial materials can offer support in 
human rights cases.st For example, in the controversial opinion 
that struck down Texas' anti-sodomy law, Justice Kennedy of the 
U.S. Supreme Court referenced decisions by the European Court of 
19 /d. at 33. 
on The following two sec tions broa dl y borrow insights from various m odels 
of judicia l beh avior that have been developed in the analysis of judicial decision-
making in the United States . See geuerally POSNER, supra note 5, at 19-56 
(describing the dominant theories of judicial behavior); NANCY MA VEETY, THt: 
PIONE ERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006) (surveying the foundational work of 
prom inent scholars of judicial behavior). Some a rguments fit within the " lega l 
mode
l" 
of judicia l dec ision-making, whereby jud ges, in the scenarios 
contemplated in this Comment, use internationa l and foreign human ri gh ts 
materials to logica lly reason outcom es. See FRANK CROSS, DECISION tv'IAKfNG IN THE 
U.S. CoU RT OF APPEA LS 40 (2007) (describing judicial dec is ion making as the 
applicatio n o f "leg itima te lega l material " to "the ascertainab le facts of the case to 
reach a rulin g") 
5l COLLOQUI Utv! ON THE DOiV!ESTIC APPUCAT ION Of INTERNATION AL f-lU\1 :\N 
RIGHTS NoRtv!S, Bnngolore Principles (1988), nunilnble at http: / jwww.chr.up. ac.za 
/hr_docs/ african/ docs/ o ther/ cwnl.cloc (noting tha t "there is a grow ing 
tendencv for nat iona l cour ts to have regard to these international norms for the 
purpose of deciding cases w here the domes tic law-whether cons titutionu l, 
s tatute or common law-is uncertain or incornple te" and tha t "[t]his tend ency is 
entirely welcome beca use it respects the universality of fun damental human 
righ ts and freedom s and the vi tal role of a n independent judiciary in reconciling 
the competing claims of indi viduals and gro u ps of persons w ith the ge nera l 
interes ts of the community") . The Bangalore Principles were set forth at a 
co lloquium attended by common law judges in 1988. 
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Human Rights in protecting the sexual privacy of ad ults. s2 In a 
seminal opinion that struck down the dea th penalty in South 
Africa, Justice Chaskalson relied on international and comparative 
precedents~ In order to confront the p roblem of enforced 
disappearances in Nepa 1, whose legal corpus lacked robust 
provisions to confront this problem, the Nepali Supreme Court 
relied on international law, regional human righ ts systems, and the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance5+ to con<pel the Nepali Government to 
crin1inalize enforced di~;0ppearances. 5 5 In all of these cases, the 
un derlining human ri ghts claim \Vas politically contentiouss6 and 
52 See Lawrence v. T\.'xas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (referring to a Europea n 
Court of Human Rights ' op inion stating that a law s imi lar to the Texas la w was 
proscribed by the European Convention of Human Rights); ~ee nlso Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2007) (argu in g, in str ik ing down the dea th pena lty fo r 
juveni les, tha t " [t]he opinion of the world conmmnity, while not controlling our 
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own 
co nclusions"); see gcncm!!y Melissa A Waters, Creeping Monis!ll: The Judicial Trend 
Towa rd 
Iute
rpretiue In co rpomtion ot" Hun uJ/1 Rigllts Trcatie~, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 
628 (2007) ("Common law jud ges arc increasingly abandoning their traditional 
dualist orientation to trc<lties and are beginning to utili ze human rights treaties 
despite the absence of implementing legislation givin g domestic legal effect to the 
treaties.") . 
53 Sec State v. Mabvanvanc & Another 1905 (3) SA 391 (CC) ~~ 33-95 (S.Afr.) 
(canvassing the implicat ions of capital p unishment in co mparative and 
interna tional law) . 
5-l Interna tional Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, opened lLn· sig11oturc Feb. 6, 2007, G.A. Res. A/RES/61/ 177, U.N. 
Doc.Aj 61/488. This Convention is not yet in force. 
ss Sec Press Release, Un ited Na tions Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in Nep<ll, OHCFlR-N epal Welcomes Supreme Court's Ground-
Breaking Decision on Disappea rances (Jan. 4, 2007), mmi/nble nt 
http:/ j nepal.ohchr.org/ en/ resources/ Documents/Eng! ish/ pressreleases/Year 
'){,202007 / JUN2007 /2007 _06_04_HCR_D isappearnaces_E.pd f ("The decision 
incl uded an order that the Government enact a law vvh ich would criminalize 
enforced d isappearance in line with the International Con vention for the 
Protec tion of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance .... "). 
C,6 Sec Lnwre11ce ''· Tc:ros, 539 U.S. at 602 (Sca lia, ]., dissenting) ("Today's 
opin ion is the product of a Co urt, vvh ich is the product of a bw-profession 
c ~dture, that has largely signed on to the ''o-call ed homosexual agenda , by which I 
mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists direc ted at eliminating 
the moral opprobrium that has tra ditionally e1ttached to homosexual conduct."); 
?v1oyiga Nduru, Dcnlfl Penalty: C11 ll s for tl1e P..ctum of Cnpitn/ Prlllislnncnt in Soulli 
Ati·icn, IPS, June 7, 2006, nuniln!J!c nt http:/ / ipsnews.netjnews.asp?idnews=33527 
(Liescribing attempts to scale back on the Mnkwanynnc dec ision); UN Probing Ncpnl 
Disnppeomnces, BBC NEWS, Dec. 6, 2004, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi / south_asia 
/4071171.stm (describing the difficulty of responding to enforced disappearances 
in Nepal). 
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international human rights la.v\' provided a crutch to those judges 
vvho wished to confront these issues. I'/Ioreover, judicial inclusion 
of foreign or international sources can hel~' align that country to a 
\..__..} .l \._j ...I 
progressive, global framework in vvhich hun1an rights are more 
vigorously protectedY 
2.4. Costs Facing Judgcsss 
Judges using a "creeping lllC>rtisrn"~'1 approach to human rights 
implementation may raise fears judici<:d activism that might 
undennine the sevaration of DO\v ers cmd domestic accountabilitY. 
l_ l ....1 
Yuval Shany suggests that "[t]he ability of courts to step outside of 
the 'four corners' of the text and to fill an existing normative cast 
with contents derived from international law sources liberates 
judges from the obligation to abide the original intent of the 
norm's drafters ... [and] amplifies their law-creating role .... "60 
Furthermore, a judge's interpretation of international human rights 
law empowers judicial officials to interpret the contours of 
international law over domestic legislatures. In democratic 
systems that value a judiciary's commitment to the separation of 
powers, judges might be hesitant to transcend this perceived 
boundary by invoking an international human rights approach.61 
In terms of domestic accountability, jud ges empowered by 
international human rights la1..v to further unmet hurnan rights 
benchmarks may be "vievved as incompatible with notions of 
popular sovereignty." 62 By proactively using human rights treaties 
s1 See Christopher McCrudden, /-!unum R.ig!zt~ nnd ]udicinl Use of Conzparntiue 
Law, in JUDICIAL COMPARATIVISM li'J Hurvlr\ \! R!CHT5 CASES 1, 12 (Esin Orlicli ed., 
2003) ("Having regard to the judicial decisions of other jurisdictions in the area of 
human rights is perceived as part of 21 larger project of economic or social 
integration, or as a continuation of a common histor:v."). 
58 As vvith perceived political costs, the pern·ived judicial costs are all open to 
serious normative attack. The point of this section is to identify the costs that 
judges may perceive in employing an internc1tional humcm rights approach. 
SY Waters, supm note 52, at 628. Creeping monism is the idea that 
international law can slowly be incorporc1ted into the clornestic legal corpus 
through incremental direct applications h the judiciary. 
hU Yuval Shany, I-! ow Suprci!IC IS tiu: Suprci!IC LliL' or tile Loud 7 Conzparntiue 
Analt;sis of tlw Influence of Intemutionui I-lu111nli Rights Trmties Upon tlzc Intcrpretnli011 
ofConstitutilJJwl Texts by OoJJ!e tic Court,,, 31 BFOOI<. J.I;\(L L. 341, 378 (2006). 
6t For a critique of this argument, see l\brtin 5. Flahertv, Scpnmlion of Powers 
in 11 Global Context, in ]UDCES, TRANSITION. X\D I-IU;<,IA\i RICHTS 9, 12 (John Morison, 
Kieran McEvoy, & Gordon Anthony eds., 2007). 
62 Shany, supm note 60, at 384. 
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to further 21 human rights agenda, judges face the costs of 
appearing distanced from the national valu es that the judiciary is 
purported to embody. Furthermore, using an international hum21n 
ri ghts approach in light of perceived lacunae in dom estic 
jurisprudence n•ight smack of an " irltemational 
co untermajoritarian difficulty," whereby judges th1..vart the 
comm on will in furth erance of international standards.63 
Moreover, incorporation of human rights trea ties ag~:<ins t 
prevai ling national values, perceived as the imp!ernentation of a 
po liticized and distant body of lavv, might "put co urts on a 
colli sion course with the executive and legislative branches." 6-l For 
thi s reason, Michael Kirby, Honorable Judge of the High Court of 
Austra lia has cautioned: 
[C]ritics have pointed to the generality of the express ion c;f 
many of the provisions contained in in ternational human 
rights instruments. Of necessity, these a re stated in 
language lacking in precision. This m eans that those who 
use them may be tempted to read into the broad language 
what they hope, expect or want to see. vVhilst the judge of 
the common law tradition has an indisputable creative role, 
su ch creativity must be restra ined. It must proceed in a 
judicial way. It must not undermine the primacy of 
democratic law-making by the organs of government, 
directly or indirectly accountable to the people ... . 6s 
An additional judicial cost to implementing human rights 
obligations is international law' s threat to legal coherence. Judicial 
actors may fear disruption caused by imposing international 
s tandards on the prevailing domestic legal corpus, particularly 
when judicial actors on their own are the sole engine for such 
r,:; Roger P. Alford, t'vii susiug lntemntionnl Soum:s to lnterl'ret tlze Co115titutiuu, 
98 A:vr ]. INT' L L. 57,59 (2004) . See generally Too bin, supra note 21 (highlighting the 
conten tiousness of using international law in the Supreme Co urt); Forei gn 
Jud gments, suprn note 21 (noting the House of Representative's uncomfortabl e 
reaction to the use of foreign law to interpret U.S. lavv). 
61 
Shany, 
supm note 60, a t 397. 
65 H onorable Justi ce Michae l Kirby, Justice of the High Co urt of Austl., The 
Road fro m Bangalore: The Firs t Ten years of the Banga lore Principles on the 
Domestic Application of Inte rnat ional Human Rights Norms, m..>ailablc at 
ht tp: / j www.hcourt.gov.au/ speeches/ kirbyj/ kirbyj_ba ngll.htm (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2009) . 
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re form.66 Furthermore, a lack of adequate trammg in the norms 
and methodologies in international law may very well exacerbate 
this hesitancy to incorporate international human rights lavv in a 
judicial setting.67 For example, Leondro Despouy describes some 
judiciaries as reluctant to be "'colonized' through the importation 
of legal and judicial norms foreign to their own." 6S 
Finally, judicial actors are susceptible to the same cultura l 
identity politics that plague political actors. Some commentators 
argue that "a robust u se of international so urces could have the 
unintended consequence of underm.ining . . . constitutional 
guara ntees" by imposing an international countermajoritarian 
ideology against domestic standards. 69 As a result, judicial 
invocation of "international protection might be viewed as a 
redundant gesture, entailing more potential ri sks of diluting local 
standards than potential benefits for normative progress." 70 For 
example, some commentators have observed that African countries 
have not had the opportunity to contribute to the development of 
international law.n This observation is one of the pillars of the 
cultural relativism critique of universal human rights standards. In 
turn, the presence of such tensions may very well give judicial 
actors second thoughts about incorporating international human 
rights law to correct domestic norms that contravene international 
human rights. 
2.5. Sun znwry 
The above discussion demonstrates that the political and 
judicial use of the international human rights approach is not cost-
neutral. Rather, using international human rights law imports 
both political and judicial costs and benefits. For policymakers 
66 Shany, supra note 60, at 389-90. 
67 id. at 396. See olso McCrudden, supra note 57, at 16 (noting " the degree of 
fear by judges tha t lack of judicial competence in the technical legal aspects of the 
other jurisdiction will lea d to mistakes being made, prompting an unease in using 
such cases as persuasive preceden t."). 
GS Lcundro 0. Despouy, Perspectives on Judicial Dialogue and Cooperation: 
Keynote Address at American Society of Internationa l Law Conference (Dec. 1-2, 
1006), iu 48 H A I\V. lNT'L L.J. ONLINE 48 (2007), http:/ jwww.harvardilj .org/onlinc 
/ 107 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). 
6S' Alford, supra note 63, at 58. 
70 Shany, supm no te 60, at 394. 
71 TIYANJANA MALUWA, I NTERNATIONAL L AW IN POST-COLO NIAL AFRI CA xv ii 
(1999) (quoting A. Peter Mutharika) . 
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seeking to combat culturally grounded human rights abuses, these 
costs and benefits must be w eighed in order to determine whether 
international human rights norms should be explicitly included in 
the policy discourse. fn some instances, interna tional human rights 
law might be a powerful tool that allows political and judicial 
actors to offset any cos ts of confronting thorny political and 
cultural questions with judicial and political benefits. On the other 
hand, the costs of politically or judicially invoking international 
human rights discourse to combat culturally grounded human 
rights benefits may very we ll outweigh the benefits associated with 
using international human rights law.72 The following two sections 
unpack these divergences in Turkey and Liberia. 
3. HONOR KILU NGS AND H ONO R S UICIDES lN T URKEY: A C ASE FOf~ 
AN INTERNATI ONAL HUMAN RI GHT S APPROACH 
This Section will s itua te the analytical framework developed in 
the previous section in the context of honor killings and honor 
suicides in Turkey. Firs t, this Section will describe honor killings 
and honor suicides and argue that these practices violate Turkey's 
human rights obligations. Then, this Section will consider the 
political and judicial costs and benefits of employing an 
international human rights approach in Turkey to address honor 
killings and suicides. Ultimat ely, this Section argues that Turkey's 
application to join the European Union, with its resulting political 
and judicial obligatior1s, and the demographics of populations that 
condone honor killings and honor suicides in Turkey, make an 
international human rights approach effective in Turkey. 
3.1. Honor Killings nnd Honor Suicides 
In a country with sharp regional differences in human 
development/3 honor killings and honor suicides have been most 
prevalent in Eastern Turkey, where feudal, patriarchal political 
72 As the subsequent di sc ussion will demonstrate, a va riety of factors may 
amplify or minimize the poli t ica l and judicial costs and benefit s of employing a 
human rights approach. This Co mment discusses factors relevant in the Turkish 
and Liberian contexts and is no t mea nt to serve as an exhaustive li st of factors that 
affect the cost-benefit analys is of the international human rights approach. 
73 See Metin Ozaslan, Si.il en t Dincer, & Hi.isey in Ozg iir, Regio nal Disparities 
and Te rr
itor
ia l IllLiic ato rs in Turke y: Socio-Eco nollli c De velopmeut Index (SEDI) , SOCI O-
ECON. D EV . ISSUES (2006) http:// www-sre. w u-wien.ac.at/ ersa/ ersaconfs/ ersa06 
/ papers/858.pdf (describing regional development dispa rities in Turkey). 
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o rga nization exists alongside forma l state ins tituti onsJ-t In Eastern 
Turkey, nine ty percen t of women working in agr iculture s till carry 
the sta tus of an unpaid fan1i ly laborer 7 5 The region also has the 
highest fertility rate in TurkeyJ6 Furth er, in parts of Anatolia, 
fent.ale educa tion is seen as a waste, given the high fin ancial costs 
of sending children to school./7 
In Turkey and other parts of the Middle East, the concept of 
honor is II at the foreground .";::; For women, honor has been 
inex tricably linked to their "chas tity ... dressing properly, [and] 
conducting [then1selves] accordin g to .. . traditions." 79 Virginity, 
II considered a family right" is one of the penultimate elements of 
honor; because virginity is considered fami ly property and not an 
individual choice of a wo man, a vvoman's sexual choices are 
effec tively delegated to h er famil y.orl Given the primacy placed on 
a woman's honor, "the custo mary penalty for preadolescent, 
adolescent, and adu lt women suspected of having vio la ted the 
limits on sexual behavior CIS imposed by tradition ... is ... dea th, 
the so called 'honour killings."'81 Typically, once a family member 
is notified of a woman's "sexuC\l disgrace," a council of male 
relatives convenes to decide her fa te, sometimes concluding that 
only death can restore the family's honor.82 A United Nations poll 
revealed that seventeen percent of Turkish men approved of honor 
killings, and many more men approved of measures short of 
killing, such as cutting off a woman's nose.83 
74 Pinar llkkaracan, Women for Women's H um. Rts., Exploring tile Contex t of 
Wolllt:ll's Sexun/itt; ill Eas tern Turlcct;, 6 REPRODUCTIVE H EALT H M ATTE RS 66, 66 
(1998). 
75 Asuman Aytekin Inceoglu, So-w/led "Hon ou r Killings" a  a Social Conflict in 
Tu rkct;, in CONFLICTS Ai\:D C ONFLICT Fi.ESO l.UTIOlJ IN MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIET IES -
BETWEEN TRAD ITION ;\ND MoDERNITY 317, 319 (Hans-ji:irg Albrecht et al. eels ., 2006) 
76 /d. Cit 319- 20. 
77 1d.at 320 . 
78 UN Popu lation Fund, Tlzc Oyllimzics of Honor Killing in Turkey: 
Prospects _fo
r Action, 
16 (Nov. 2005) (prc;mrcd by Filiz I<arclam), ac'llilable at 
http://www. unfpa.org/ upload/ lib_pu b_ fi lc/ 676_file name_ho nourkillings.pd f. 
79 [d. 
so lnceoglu, supra note 75, at 322- 23. 
Kt Jd. at 317. 
s2 Dan Bi lefsky, How to Auoid Hon or Killings in Turkey? Hon or Su icide, NY 
T IMES, Jul y Hi, 2006, at A3. 
S3 Tracy Wilkinson, Taking the 'Hon or' Out of Killing Women, LA. T IMES, Jan. 9, 
2007, at A4. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/2
J 
2009] A NON-UNIV ERSAL PROCESS 1403 
Traditionally throughout the Middle East, legisl a tures have 
provided leniency to those men who murd er w omen in the name 
of honor. For example, in cases of adultery, the laws take " into 
account the psychological state of mind tha t hits the husband 
vv hose honour has been violated, the m ost precious th ing that he 
possesses. At the moment he catches his wife committing adu ltery, 
he will no doubt lose hi s reason and kill his wife and her 
partner." S-l Before Turkey began its serious efforts in Europea n 
Union accession,ss Article 462 of the Turkish Penal Code (Turk 
Ceza Kanunu ("TCK")) provided sign ifican tly red uced sentences 
(four to eight years instead of life impr isonment or five to ten years 
ins tead of death sentences) to those perpe trators who murder: 
[A]t the time the v ictim is ca ught in the act of adultery or 
illegal sexual intercourse, or while the victirn was abo ut to 
commit adultery or engage in illegal sexu al intercourse, or 
while the victim was in a situation showing, free from an y 
d oubt, tha t he or she has jus t completed the act of adultery 
or sexual intercourse ... S6 
To meet the human rights requirem en ts of EU accession, the 
Turkish parliament revoked Article 46287 and recommended that 
such killings be punished with " life imprisonment with hard 
labor." 88 However, Article 51 of the TCK provides perpetrators 
with a mitigating provocation defense, resulting in a two-thirds 
sentence reduction, where the perpetrator "has committed murder 
because of 'uncontrollable grief' or as a result of 
s• Lama Abu-O deh, Crimes of F-lonur and Construction of Gmtifr ill Amb 
Societies, in WOMEN AND 5EXUAUTY .fN MUSLIM SOCI ETIES 363, 367 (Pinar Ilkkaracan 
ed ., 2000) (quoting ABDUL-HA i"vl fD SLAW AR51, ON ACC RAVr\T lNG Ai\iD EXTE!\: UATI NG 
CrRCUMS TANC: ES 36 (1 986) ). 
S5 A fuller discussion of the effects of E.U. accession politics in Turkey is in 
the fo llowin g subsection. 
06 Canan Arin, Criminal Code Report: Turkey, SEEU N E 
http:/ I web.archi ve.orgl w eb l 20051116232344l http:1 I wvv w.seclin e-pr ojec t.net 
I CCRI TurkcyCCR. h tm (unoffici al tra nsla tio n) (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). 
S7 Rebecca E. Soon, N ote, Tiley Killed Her fo r Going Ou t wit/1 Boys : Hono r 
Killings in Turkey in Ligl1t o(Turkey's Accession t'o the European Uuion ond Les sons for 
Iraq, 35 H OFSTR A L. REv. 815, 829- 30 (2006). See olso Wilkin son, supra note 83 
(quoting a Turkish law maker \Vho no ted tha t "On paper, we seem to ha ve 
achieved a lot" bu t that "when we go o ut into the fiel d, \VC recognize that a lot 
more needs to be done"). 
ss Yasemin c;:elik Levin, T!u: Effect of CEDAW on Women's Righ ts, in HUMA N 
RIGHTS IN TURKEY 202, 212-13 (Zehra F. Ka basakal Arat ed ., 2007) . 
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provocation . . .. "s<J Some human rights commentators have 
cautioned that the provocation provision9o "employs the very same 
case of suspected or witnessed infideli ty as an example of unjust 
provocation, thereby openly proving tha t the annulment of Article 
462 was a merely fe igned gesture lacking any actual intent to stop 
honor killings."91 Further, in light of the legal penalties that 
Turkey has im.plemented to meet EU hum an rights requirements, 
the practice of h onor killings has begun to morph into honor 
suicides. 92 In parts of Eastern Turkey, " [f]arn ili es o f disgraced girls 
are choosing between sacrificing a son to a life in prison by 
designating him to kill his sister or forcing their daughters to kill 
themselves .... "93 It is unclear whether aiding or abetting a 
woman' s suicide could constitute a criminal offence; however, it 
appears that the emerging suicide probl em in Eas tern Turkey has 
not been subjec t to prosecution.9·1 Local organizations have 
foc used on educa ting young women on their rights, instead of 
pursuing criminal sanctions against those who urge young women 
89 Dicle Kogacioglu, TI1e Trndition Effect: Fnwziug Houor Cri111es in Tu rkey, 15 
DIFFERENCES 118, 123 (2004). 
90 Granted, while most lega l systems offer a miti ga ting defense for cr imes of 
passion, it remains unclear w he ther this provision could be a loophole for 
perpetrators of honor killings to receive reduced sen tences, especially in Turkish 
co urts that feel geographically (and culturally) removed from Ankara . 
91 WOMEN FOR WOMEN'S HUM. RTS., GENDER DISCRIM INATION IN THE TURK ISH 
PENAL CODE DRAFT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DRMT LAW FROM A GENDER 
PERSPECTIVE AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS BY THE WOMEN'S PLATFORM ON THE PENAL 
CODE 7 (Liz E. Arnado trans. , 2003), nuniloble nt http:/ /www.wwhr.org/files 
/2_3.pdf. But see Good Morning- Turkey, J-[URRIYET DA ILY NEWS (Turk.), Feb. 13, 
2009, truailnble nt http:// www.h urri ye t. com.tr/ engl ish/ domestic/10994185 
.asp7scr=1 ("The Supreme Court of Appeals overruled a sentence of life 
imprisonment given to Fuat Karadag who murdered his pregnant niece in an 
honor kill ing on the ground that life imprisonment was not an enough [sic] 
verd ict for h onor killing. Th e court sa id that the convic t should be sentenced to 
aggravated life imprisonment. If sentenced to aggrava ted life imprisonment, the 
convict wil l n ot be able to benefit from amnesty.") 
n See Bilefsky, supm note 82 (describing how some Turk ish women are being 
forced to commit suicid e so that their famili es cc1 n avo id more stringent p enalties). 
93 !d. 
9~ See Press Release, United Na tions, Statement by Prof. Yakin Erturk, Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequ ences (Mar. 
20, 2007), nuailnble at h ttp:/ ,iwww .unhchr.ch / hurica ne/ huricane.ns f/view01 
j B27F8SDC6969C7E9C12572AA003BE38D7opendocument (noting tha t because 
honor killings are now subject to prosecution, such acts have morphed into 
suicides and accidents in ord er to evade prosecution). 
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to commit suicide.95 This may suggest that legal penalties may be 
unavailable to those that abet honor suicides. 
3.2. Honor Killings nnd Honor Suicides: Implications in Internntionnl 
Humm1 Rights Lnw% 
Under international human rights law and the regional human 
rights law of the European Union, honor killings contravene the 
rights of women. At the most basic level, honor killings violate a 
woman's right to life, enshrined in the Universal Declaration and 
Article 6 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political 
Rights.97 Turkey is a party to the Convention on the Elin1ination of 
All Kinds of Discrimination Against Women CCEDAW"), the 
human rights treaty that most directly implicates women's rights .9s 
The practice of honor killings or the aiding and abetting of honor 
suicides constitutes a form of discrimination, defined by the 
CEDAW as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the 
basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or 
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field."<J9 To 
the extent that provocation defenses may still be available to 
perpetrators of honor killings, and to the extent that Turkey is not 
taking sufficient measures to prevent and protect women from 
honor killings or honor suicides, Turkey is in violation of its 
obligation under CEDAW "[t]o establish legal protection of the 
rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through 
competent national tribunals and other public institutions the 
95 Sec Wilkinson, .'upm note 83 (noting that local advocacy groups were 
holding town meetings and setting up emergency hotlines to respond to the 
problem). 
% This section will not provide an exhaustive examination of all the relevant 
provisions of internationc1l human rights law implicated by honor killings in 
Turkey. Rather, the purpose of the section is to provide a basic overview of the 
international human rights norms at play in the honor killing and suicide context 
in Turkey. 
97 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, opened for 
signnturc Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (accession by Turkey on Dec. 23, 2003) 
[hereinafter ICCPP.]. 
98 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, ope11cd for sig11nture Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (accession by Turkey 
on Dec. 20, 1985) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
99 Id. art. 1. 
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effective pro tec tion of \Nom en agains t any act of discrimina tion ... 
. "wo Furthermore, Article S(a) of CEDAW is implicated, insofar as 
honor killings or suicides constitute a "cultural pat tern[] ... based 
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes 
or on stereotyped ro les for men and women" that Turkey is 
obligated to m od if ywt 
Because Turkey seeks m.embership to the European Union, it 
has accepted the Jcccssion requirements established in the 
Copenhagen Criteria . Tl1e politica l principle furthered by the 
Copenhagen Criteria requ ires that Turkey "achieve[] s tability of 
institutions guaranteeing d emo cracy, the rule of lavv, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities." 102 Relevant to this 
discuss ion, the accession partnership agreen1ent demanded, in 
part, that Turkey "[c]mnply with the European Convention for the 
Protection of Hum.an Rights an d Fundamental Freedoms, 
including respect of the judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights ... strengthen the independence and efficiency of 
the judiciary and promote consis tent interpretation of legal 
provisions related to human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
line with the European Convention on J--Iuman Ri ght s," and "[t]ake 
measures with a view to ensuring that the obligation for all judicial 
authorities to take into account the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights is respected." 103 By seeking membership to the 
European Union, Turkey not only reitera ted its commitment to 
international human rights norms, but also agreed to put its 
judiciary at the center of meeting those obliga tions.1 0-+ 
1Llt 1 Jd. art. 2(c). 
101 Jd. art 5(a) . Sec ge nemlly Elizabeth Sepp er, Conji"onling tlze "Sac red and 
Uucluwgeab/e ": T11c Obli gation to Modif!J Cui /urn/ Pnt/ems under the !1\iomen 's 
Discrimiuntiou Treaty, 30 U. P1\. J l !\!T'L L. 585 (2008) (discussing the contours of the 
obligation enshrined in article S(a) of CEDA W). 
I02 Council Decision of 19 i'vlay 2003 on the Princip les, Priorities, Intermediate 
Objectives and Conditions ContCJined in the Accession Par tnership with Turkey, 
art. 2, 2003 O.J. (L 145) l\nnex [hereinafter Cou nci l Decision]. 
1(13 Jd. 
10-1 McCrudden notes, in fact that lhc judicial impu lse to cite law from foreign 
or internationa l jurisdictions " will be stronges t ... when the integration is set ou t 
explicitly as a political programme, with institutional character istics, such as in 
Europe." McCrudden, supra note 57, at l3. Orlicli argues tha t " [a] s the judges 
start regardin g the membe r states of the Eu rop ean Union as the audience to 
impress in addi tion to the domestic a udience of various shades, then references to 
decisions of courts of fo reign jur isdictions and the European Court of Human 
Rights and the EL1ropean Court of Justice m.ay become more explicit and 
persuasive." Esin Orlici.i, The Tu rkis/1 Expe rimce with Judi cio / Conzporativisnz in 
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3.3. The Politicn/ nnd Ju dicial Advantages ofn;z Intcmat ionnl Human 
Riglzts Approncl! to Co lllbclt Hono r Kill ings nu d Honor Su icides in 
Turkey 
In Turkev, international human righ ts ins trum.ents embodied in 
- v 
Western norms of justice will likely be an effective means to 
confront the honor killings problem at the level of national 
dialogu e and policymaking.t os 
3.3.1. Political Benefits Ou tweix/1 tl1c Po!iticnl Costs of 
Colllbnting Honor Killings nnd Honor Suicides in Turkey 
Two fac tor s essentially make the international human rights 
approach favorable for politica l actors at a national level in Turkey. 
Firs t, bee a use honor killings are for the n:.ost part concen trated in 
Eastern Turkey, national parliamentarians face less political 
pressure in confronting these crimes. 1Dh The population densi ty of 
Eastern Turkey cannot compete vv ith the large urban centers found 
in Western Turkey: nearly seventy-five percent of Wes tern 
Turkey's population is urban, comp<.1red with forty-six percent in 
the East.l07 Therefore, relative to the politics at the national center, 
those in Eastern Turkey who wish to condone honor killings and 
honor suicides do not enjoy the political leverage necessary to 
Hunum Rights CtJ scs, in JUDICIAL CO!vtPARATIVI Sivt I:'-' H U:VIAN R IGHTS CASES, supra 
note 57, 131 a t 157. Sec also inji·a text accompan vi ng note 128 (describing the 
Turk ish judiciary' s engagem ent with the Europ ean Convent ion on Human Rights 
and the European Court of Human Rights). 
lOS Surely, international human rights law w ill not be able to sing le-handedly 
change the underlying socioeconomic, cultu ra l, and politico! conditions that 
enoblc honor killings 2md honor suic id es to occur. A t the loca l level, extensive 
educational awareness efforts an d support st.Tv ices for women are fundamental to 
addressing th.c prob lem. However, thi s Seci :ion d emon strates that at a n ational 
po licy lev el, a n internatio na l human ri ghts app roach an help fill in or identi fy 
lacuna e in Tur ki sh laws that a llow perpet rators of hon or killings or abettors of 
honor su ici des to s lip through withou t punishm ent. 
1116 Sec G<:1ry S. Becker, A Co Jillll t' llt 011 t!w Co nfcrcucc 011 Co st-Be nefit Anolysis, 29 
j. LEGAL STUD. 1149, 1152 (2000) (d escribing the im pact of interest group politics 
on politica l cos t-benefit ana lysis) . 
101 llkkaracan, supra note 74, at 67. 
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a ttack national po liticia ns en gaged in ridding Turkey of harmfuC 
culturally grounded human righ ts abuses. 1us 
Second, e limina tin g honor killings or suicides in Turkey can 
help Turkey gain accession to the European Union. 1l1 9 Turkey's 
population initially viewed accession to the European Union 
favo rably,1IO even though popular support has bcgur1 to vvane 
because of various impedin1ents thCit have surfaced during the 
negotiating process .111 A recent EuroBarometer Report showed 
thCit forty-three percent viewed the E.U. fCivorably an d forty-five 
percent supported enlargement. These results indicate popular 
frus tratio n with Europe's tough negotiating stance, but do not 
necessarily mark Cl shift in pursuing a pro-European, pro-VVestern 
political trajec tory embod ied by policies of Ata tu rk .11 2 In any 
event, political actors who push effective policies that further E.U. 
accession do have a significant domes tic suppor t base . As a result, 
there are real political advantages to pursuing policies, including 
implementing human rights norms no t fully actualized in Turkey, 
tha t further Turkey's prospects for E.U. accession. Any political 
costs associated with confronting honor killings (and its recent 
tns Sec supra text accompanying notes 27-36 and accompanying tex t 
(describing how th e s trength of the domes ti c support base affects the inte rnational 
hun1an righ ts approach calculation ). 
109 See Press Release, European Parliament, Turkey: MEPs concern ed at lack 
of progress in ta lks wi th EU (Feb. 11, 2009), auai/able at http: / jvvww.europarl 
.europa .eu/ news/ exper t/ infop ress_page/ 027-48800-040-02-07-903-
20090209IPR4876'1-09-02-2009-2009-fa lse/ d efault_sv .h tm (sta ti ng that the EU 
Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a reso lution demanding that Turkey reduce 
the number of honor ki llings). 
t to New Eurobaroill ctcr Poll Results Show a Drop in Tu rkis h Support _f(n tlw EU, 
H URRI YIT , July 7, 2006, http:/ jwww.hurriyet.com.tr/english 
/ 4713737.asp?gicl=74. Sec also Til e Eucr Len gtlzcniu g Road , T1 iE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 
2006, at 54 (describing the increas ing difficulty T urke y is h avi ng in m ak ing 
progress on EU accession). 
111 Sec gclll:rally, Turkey 2007 Progress Report Accolllpt7nying tlzc Cou nnuniwtion 
ji·ouz tlze Colllmission to tlzc EuropcmL Pnrlimne11t mzd t!zc Cou ncil, COM (2007) 633 
final (June 11, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Progress Report], ouailn/Jic nt 
http:// ec.e uropa.eu / enlargement/ pdf/ key _docum ents/ 2007 / nov/ turkey 
_progress_reports_en.pdf (discussing Turkey' s shortcomings in mee ting its 
accession obligations). 
t t2 For a tou r of the deba te surrounding seculari s m a nd po liti ca l Islam in 
Turkish politi cs, see STEPHEN KINZER, CR ESC ENT AND 5T,u .f': T URK EY BETWEEN TVVCl 
WORL DS (Farrar, Straus, and Griou x1994); BERNA RD LEW IS, TH E Erv iERGENCE OF 
MODER
N 
TURK EY (3rd ed ., 2002); ERI C J. ZURCH ER, TUI,KEY: A MODERN H ISTORY (rev. 
e el. 2004); BERNA TURAI'vl, BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE STATE: T HE POLITICS OF 
ENGAGEMENT (2007); ESRA 0ZY0REK, NOSTALGIA FOR THE MODERN: STATE 
SECULARISM AND EVERYDAY POLITICS IN T URKEY (2006). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/2
2009j A NON-UNIVERSAL PROCESS 1409 
morph into honor suicide) can be externalized in a process of 
aggressively seeking E.U. membership. Furthermore, u sing the 
international human rights discourse will allow political actors to 
demonstrate their seriousness in satisfying the human rights 
elen1ents of the Copenhagen Criteria because the language of 
international human rights will help political actors signify that 
they are serious about the Criteria.11 3 These gains \vould help 
overcome the political costs of the international human rights 
approach intrinsic in human righ ts law implementation.n-l 
Furthermore, political use of the international human rights 
disco urse will help political actors align with international and 
Europea n and Turkish civil society,t15 international donors,t i6 and 
foreign governments committed to protecting women's rights and 
ending honor killings and suicides.117 Pursuing a favorable human 
rights policy will help Turkish political actors curry fa vor 1.vith 
foreign governments. Indeed, the United States favorably received 
Turkey's recent penal code reforms. 11 S In addition, USAID, 
supporting Turkey's admission to the E.U. , provides funds to 
support economic development and reduce unemployment in 
Turkeyn9 While this assistance is not directly attached to a human 
rights agenda, such assistance supports the larger E.U. accession 
process that includes the firm implementation of human rights 
m See, t'.g ., Turkis/1 Lnw Ensing Curbs on Speecil Win s Praise, N.Y. TIM ES, May 1, 
2008, at A13 (ev id encing the po litical benefits for Turkish politicians of 
implementing laws strengthening human rights protections by notin g tha t the 
Pres iden t of the European Union d eclared, "This s tep is both positive for Turkey 
and an indication of Turkey's continuing commitment to the reform process." ). 
t i .J Sec supm tex t accompany ing notes 27-36 (describing how the s trength of 
the domes tic support base affects the international human rights approach 
calculation). 
llo St'c Yildiz Ecev it, Wonu:n's Ri ghts, Wolllcl1's Orgrmiztltions, and tl1e State, in 
H UM, \1'-S RIGHTS IN TURKEY, supra note 88, 187 a t 187 (describing the growth of 
domestic civil society organizations promoting women's human rights) . 
11 6 For a general overview of Turkey's engagement with reg ional and g lobal 
h uman rights syst ems and actors, see Fusun Turkmen, Turk ey's Participation in 
Global and Regional Human Ri gl1t s Re i111es , in H Ui'v!AN R!CHTS IN TURKEY, supm note 
88, a t 249, 249. 
tt7 See supm text accompan ying no tes 30- 36 (describing how the availability 
of in terna tiona l support affects the international human rights approach calc ulus) . 
11s See Presiden t George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Istanbul , 
Turkey, 40 WEE KLY COI'viP. PR ES . Doc. 11.51 (June 29, 2004) (declaring tha t Turkey is 
moving ra pidl y to meet the criteria for membership while giving suppor t to 
Turkey's accession to the European Union). 
119 USAID, Budget: Turkey, http:/ jwww.usaid.gov /policy /budget/ cbj2006 
/ ee/ tr.html (l as t visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
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norms in Turkey. The United Kingdom asserts that it is "strong ly 
committed to supportin g Turkey's accession to the European 
Union and assis ting Turkey in the process of reform n ecessary to 
achieve this goal." 120 Therefore, because E. U. accession places a 
high premium on the implementation of international human 
rights norms, and becau se strategic partnerships are needed to 
help Turkey overcon1e some of the contentious political obstacles 
in the way of E.U. accession, the use of the interna tional human 
rights discourse will allow political agents to keep these strategic 
partners engaged in Turkey's cau se.121 
3.3.2. Jud icinl Bencfi'ts Out·wcigh th e Ju dicial Costs of Conzbating 
Honor Killill<:;;S and Honor Suicides in Turket; 
c -
An international human rights approach in the Turkish judicial 
setting also reaps n1ore advantages than the costs associated with 
the approach. Turkish political leaders consented to having the 
country's judiciary align with the juridical approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights ("EHCR").122 Therefore, the 
Turkish judiciary has essentially been given the m andate to 
incorporate European human rights law.123 This mandate helps 
minimize separation of powers and domestic accountability costs. 
Fears of undermining legal coherence124 are unwarranted in the 
Turkish context because the Turkish judiciary has been expressly 
directed to shift Turkish jurisprudence in the direction of 
international norms, and legal harmonization is essential to 
Turkey's E.U. accession. Further, cultural concerns of imposing 
non-local normative biases over national values are less at play in 
12o Foreign & Common wea lth Office, UK in Turkey, E. LT. Actio11 Plnn , 
http:/ / ukinturkey.fco.gov .uk/ cn /working-wi th-turkey /projects/ eu -action-plan 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
121 In addition to Turkey's attem.pt to curry favor with European 
governments, Turkey' s desire to strengthen its relationship w ith the Unit ed States 
provides an additional motivation to rigorously enforce its human rights 
obligations .. See Richard Falk, Forei(l{]rd, in H UMAN FIGHTS IN TURKEY, supra note 
88, at i, xi. 
122 Council Decision, supm note 102. 
m Sec 2007 Progress Repo rt, suprn note 111, at 12 (explaining that " [o]verall, 
Turkey has made progress on the ratificati on of international human righ ts 
instruments and on the execution of ECtHR judgments. H owever, the OPCAT 
remains to be ratified, <ln d further efforts are needed for Turkey to comply fully 
with its obligations under the ECHR") . 
m See suprn tex t accompanying notes 57-69 (describing how impressions of 
judicial activism might affect the decision to use international human rights law). 
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the Turkish context because of the sizable don-.estic constituency 
that supports Turkey' s accession to the European Union.12s 
In addition, Turkey's constitutional provisions on judicial 
povver provide Turkish judges vvith a comfortable space to 
incorporate international human rights provisions. Under Article 
90 of Turkey's Constitution, "[i]nt ernati ona l agreements duly put 
into effect carry the force of law," and Article 138 provide that 
judges shall "give judgment in accordance with the Constitution, 
law, and their personal conviction confonrting with the law ."126 
Article 90 h21s been interpre ted "to mean that international law 
binds domestic law." 127 These provisions, coupled with legislative 
enactrnents hMmonizing Turkish law with European human rights 
jurisprudence, diminish fears tha t Turkish judges are acting 
outsid e the scope of their judicia l povver in fashioning rules that 
co mbat honor killings and honor suicides .12S In fact, the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey recognized "supra-constitutional 
norms [for] the European Convention" and Turkey's supreme 
administrative court the Council of State, "affirmed that the 
Convention was effectively incorporated into Turkish law upon its 
ratification."l29 Further, the Cons titutional Court has premised 
decisions upholding the legal equality of men and women on 
CEDAW.B0 
European human rights jurisprudence, moreover, has m 
sever21l cases chastised the Turkish government for its failure to 
abide by European human rights norms, from its exclusion of 
political parties to its protection of defendants' due process 
rights.n' As a result, the European Court of Human Rights has not 
been associated with the policies of the central Turkish government 
12s Sec gcucrally Becker, supra note 106, at 1152 (describing the impact of 
interes t group politics on political cost-benefit analysis). 
12b TURKIYE (TURK.] UMHURIYETI ANAYASASI1982 [CONST.) arts. 90, 138. 
127 Thomas W. Smith, Leucra ging Norms: Tlzc ECHR a11d Turkey's Human Riglzts 
/~ cfLlllli S, ill H UtviAN RIGHTS IN TU!~K EY, ~upra n ote 88, at 262, 264 
12, , 5L'C ~upm text accon<panying notes 57-59 (describing how impress ions of 
judicial acti vism might affect the decision to use in ternational human rights law) . 
129 Smith, supm note 127, at 264. 
!30 Levin, supra no te 88, at 208. 
131 Smith, supm note 127, at 262 C[M]ore than 5,000 applications from Turkey 
ha \'e flooded the court's docket. For much of the 1990s, the ECHR received more 
petitions from Turkey than from any other country."). 
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and has refused to rubber stamp those decis ions.132 Therefore, the 
Court is likely to be perceived as a credible, balanced and fair 
institution within Turkey, including in the East. 133 Turkish judges 
can argue that intporting European human rights law does not 
necessarily suggest blind adherence to \1\festern norms, but rather 
sensibl e adoptions of the d eclarations of the preva iling human 
rights standards. The credibility of the courtB-+ then diminishes the 
"foreignness" of European human rights jurisprudence.135 
Given tha t the judicial costs associated with an international 
human rights approach are minirnized, the Turkish judiciary is 
effectiv ely free to enjoy the benefits of incorporating international 
hm11 <:1n rights law to combat honor killings, should they ch oose to 
do so .U6 In the contex t of honor killings, the legal lacuna res ides in 
the potential availabi1ity of a provoca tion defense and an inability 
to reach those w ho aid and abet an honor suicide. In addition, 
interna tional human rights l;:rw affords the judiciary the 
opportunity to chastise the central government for failing to fulfill 
its obligation to prevent acts of discrimination under CEDAW.B7 
Therefore, in the face of domestic legal gaps that prevent an 
effective legal response to honor killings or suicides, an 
international human rights approach (via incorporation of 
international human rights norms in judicial opinions) affords the 
m Sec id. at 262 (noting the "often rocky relations between An bra and the 
ECHR.") . 
l33 Sec e.g., United Communis t Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, App. 
N o. 133/1996/ 752/ 951 , 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 121, 146 (1998) (holding tha t Turkey 
violated Article 10 of the European Conventi on on Human Rights in banning the 
United Community Party, vv hich made refe rences to a "Kurdish" na tion in its 
found ing documents); Sener v. Turkey, App. No. 26680/ 95 (2000) (holding tha t 
Turkey violated Articles 6 and 10 of the European Co nvention on Hum an Rights 
when it prosec uted a journalist fo r threa tening the territori a l integri ty of the 
Turkish s t<ltc); Tas v . Turkey, H.R. App. No. 24396/94, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15, 35 
(2000) (hold ing tha t Turkey violated Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights by disappearing Munhin Tas). 
I :>~ Sec SCil l'J'tl lly MICHAEL D. GOLDH A BEI\, A PEOP LE' S HISTORY OF T HE EU RO PEAN 
CouRTm HU:'\ IAN RI CHTS (2007) (d escribing the achievements of the Court). 
13=' See sup m text accompanying notes 60-63 (describing how nati onil l values 
affect a judge's decision to use international human rights law). 
L\6 Sec supm tex t accompanying notes 49-55 (describing how the inte rnational 
human rights lavv can p rov ide additional authority for judges w riting progressive 
human rights decisions). 
137 CEDAW, supm note 98, art. 2(c), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 37 (requiring states "to 
ensure through competent national tribuna ls and other public institutions the 
effecti ve protection of wom en against any act of discrimination." ). 
.. 
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judiciary an opportunity to fill in legal gaps, or at the very least, 
indentify the existence of such gaps, particularly w hen the Turkish 
parliament has fail ed to act. BS 
3. 4. Swnn 111 ry 
Therefore, an in ternati onal hum an rights approach is politically 
and judicially beneficia l in the context of honor killings and 
suicides in Turkey. Bec<:1u se there is sizable support to accede to 
the European Union, and because Turkish politicians can rely on 
higher population densities in Wes tern Turkey to support their 
human rights policies, the political costs of using an international 
human rights approach are minimized, whereas the benefits a re 
pronounced. Politicians can gain po litical capita l by taking rea l 
steps to mee t the Co penhagen Criteria, and open themse lves to 
donor aid and foreign governm ent support in doing so. Judicial 
actors, moreover, have been expressly mandated by political elites 
to align their jurisprudence with the European human rights 
system. This mandate minimizes the judicial costs, namely 
accountability and separa tion issues, associated with a judicial 
international human rights a.pproach. Fu rther, charges of diluting 
national values with non-local international norms are sheltered by 
domes tic support for accession. As a result, international human 
rights law, in a judicial setting in Tu rkey, is advantageous in that it 
allows the judiciary to fill in legal gaps and chastise inefficient 
enforcem ent of women's human rights. 
4. FEM ALE C!RCUMCISfON IN LIBERIA: A C ASE AGAINST AN 
INTERNAT IONAL HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 
This Sec tion situates the analy tical framework developed in 
Section 1 and applies it to female circumcision in Liberia. Firs t, this 
Section describes the practice of fem ale circumcision and argues 
that the practice violates Liberia's international human rights 
obliga tions. Th5s Section then unpacks the political and judicial 
costs and benefi ts of employing an international human rights 
approach to combat female circumcision. Ultimately, this Section 
argues that becau se of Liber ia's political instability, the prevalence 
138 As a c ivil law co un try, th e Constitutional Co urt of Turkey is limited in its 
abilitv to "make law." Sec ARI F PAYASHOCLU, AN INTRODUCT ION TO LAW AND THE 
TURKISH LEGAL SYSTE:v! l37-38 (2d ed. 1993). However, the Constitutional Court 
has the abili ty to interpret la ws to give them a fu ll er meanin g in hum.an ri ghts 
terms . Id. 
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and support for female circunKision, and the likely alienation of 
domes tic constituen ts through politiczd and judicial processes that 
engage international hum an right s law, an international hmT1 an 
rights approach to comba t female circumcision in Liberia is a 
politically and judicially cos tly en deavor. 
4. 1. Fenznle Ci rcu111cis ion 
Female circumcision refet·s to a range of p rocedures of varying 
intrusiveness that remove parts of the female genitalio.13 9 Various 
international organizations have defined female circumcision as 
consisting of "all procedu res in volving par tial or total rem oval of 
the ex ternal fema le genita li il or other injury to the female geni tal 
organs" whe ther for cul tur<'il or o ther non-therapeutic reasons.I40 
There are four main types of female circumcision . In a 
clitoridec tomy (Type I), the prepuce and perhaps part or the entire 
clitoris is excised. I41 In a Type ll exci sion, the circumciser remo ves 
the prepuce, the clitoris, and pa rt or all of the labia minora.I42 
Infibulation (Type III) , involves the rem oval of the clitoris; in 
addition, after renwving the entire labia minora, the surface of the 
remaining genitalia is s titched together, with a small opening 
remaining for urination and menstruation .1-D Type IV refers to 
"numerou s other proced ures that have been documented, such as 
prickling, piercing, stretching or burning of the clitoris . and 
or/surrounding tissue s."1-l4 In Arabic, the term szmna, or 
139 The choice of term in English ca n import a significant degree of bias. 
Female circumcision in the Wes t is often referred to as female genital mutilation, a 
term that signifies Western appall agai nst the practice. In this Comment, l shal l 
use the term fe m a le circumcision in o r·d er to <wo id demoni z ing the adherents of 
femal e circumcision as mutilators, for such zm approach m ay impede e fforts to 
e radicate the practice. See Corm~:--JE ;\.A. PACKER, U SING HUMAN RIGHTS TO 
CHANCE TRAD ITION : TRADIT IONAL f)r:Z ,\CT ICES HAI'<(v!FU L TO WOI\•IEN'S REPI\ODUCTIV E 
H EALTH IN SUB-SA HAI\AN AFI\I CA 18 (lntersentia 2002) (noting the problems with 
transla ting the term into Engli sh). 
140 World H ealth Or~ani za ti on , Fe 111 nle Ge nital 1\!lu tilation , 
http :/ jwww.who. in t/ topics/fen~a l e_genital_mu tilation/en/ (las t vis ited April 
13, 2009). 
141 AN IKA RAHMAN & NAHID l OU I:li A, FE\! AL E GEN IT;\L MUT ILATI ON : A GU IDE 
TO 
L
AWS AND POUCIE5 WORID\VIDE' 7 (2000) . 
14 2 ld. at 8. 
143 Id. at 8; Es ther Iv!. I<isaakye, lVoniell , Culture, tllld Humnn Rights: Fe11111lc 
Genital Mutilation, Polygm ny, and Bride Price, ill Th e H UI\I AN RI GHT S OF WOI\ ·IEN : 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRU rv iENTS AND AFRiC:\N EXPER !Ei':CES 268, 270 (Wolfgang 
Benedek, Esther M. Kisaakye & Gerd Oberleitner ed s. 2002) . 
144 RAH!v!AN & TOU13IA, supm note 141, at 8. 
• 
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" tradition " is used to d escribe the process of female circumcision; 
in Sudan, female circumcision is referred to as talwr, meaning 
" purity." 1 ~ 5 Some communities circumcise the ir daughters at birth; 
o thers do so as a rite of passage ceremony during adolescence. 
Typically, women perform the procedure, and the circumciser is a 
revered n1ember of society.n6 Further, mid-vvivcs \vho ci rcumcise 
have made lucrative careers o ut of the orac tice; in Sudan and 
.l 
Cambia, circumcision income is much higher than midwife or 
nurse incom.e. H7 Circumcision usually takes place outside the 
village in secluded se ttings. One observer describes : 
The conditions under which these take place are often 
unhygienic and the ins truments used crude and 
unsterilized: usually a razor blade, a piece of glass, cl sharp 
stone, or a kitchen knife. Wounds are dabbed with a range 
of trea tments including alcohol, lemon juice, ash, earth, 
herb n1ixtures, or cow dung. After cutting, the woun d may 
be sewn closed, again usually with primiti ve sutures, such 
as thorns. The girl's legs are then bound together until her 
wounds have healed, a process which may take up to 40 
days. I4S 
Apologists of female circumetswn have proffered various 
justifications for the practice, which can be grouped into roughly 
four categories. Firs t, female circumcision, defenders of the 
practice argue, promotes health and hygiene. Apologists argue 
that removing the clitoris makes the female genitalia cleaner and 
maintain that the clitoris is a dangerous organ that may injure a 
baby during childbirth.149 Second, defenders of the practice argu e 
that female circum.cision is a matter of "physical necessity." 
Removing parts of the female genitalia, they asser t makes the 
female genitalia more attractive, increases n1ale sexual pleasure, 
preserves virginity, and decreases female sexual pleasure.t so Third, 
female circumcision is a matter of social necessi ty . Defenders of 
the practice maintain that the procedure is an in1portant puberty 
H5 PACKER, supm note 139, at 18-19 . 
14(, Kisaakye, supra note 143, a t 271-72. 
w Jd. a t 172. 
14K PACKER, supm note 139, at 22 (interna l citations omitted). 
149 Id. at 20-21. 
1so Id. at 21. 
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right and that it promotes social cohesion, reduces femal e 
pron1iscuity, and increases the matrimonial oppo rtunities of young 
women, because a n1an 111a y refuse to n1arry an uncut vVOl11a n ."l5I 
Fourth, there are religious justifica tions for female circumcision; 
some believe that the Qu'nnl requires infibulation to guarantee a 
woman's chastity1 52 
[n Sub-Saharan Africa, female circumcision is practiced in at 
least 28 countries.153 In Liberia, female circumcision heid a sixty 
percent prevalence rate (before the civil war), the majority of the 
circumcisions being the Type II varie ty.1s-1 Of Liberi a's m a jor 
ethnic groups, only three do not practice female circurncision. l55 
While prevalence rates decreased because of population 
move ments during the civil war, some expec t the prevalence rate 
to re turn to the pre-war levels as Liberians repatriate and resettle 
into their pre-war livelihoods .1 56 The practice is not confined to 
rural areas; for example, an educated lawyer in Monrovia 
underwent the procedure due to pressures from an upcountry 
grandmothe r.157 In Liberia, older women in special societies 
perform female circumcision during initia tion rites15S Before the 
civil wa r, a large initiation school operated in Monrovia, but it was 
151 !d. at 21. 
I 52 Jd. at 22. 
153 Kisaakye, supm note 143, at 270. 
1 5~ R AHiv lA N & T OUI31i\, supra note 141, at 178. 
155 !d. 
15b See Office of the Senior Coordinator for Internationai Women' s Iss ues, U.S. 
Department of State, Liberia: Report on Femal e Genital lv !utilati ou (FG!\1!) or Fen wic 
Genital Cutting (F CC), Jun. 1, 2001, http: / jwww.unhcr.org/ refworld / topicdocid 
j 46d57S7a28.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) [hereinafte r State Department, 
Li/;crin: Report 011 FGM]. 
!d. 
Many be lieve the civil war has caused a redu ction in this practice, 
es timating that the incidence bas dropped to as low as 10 percent. The 
war caused most of the population to flee to neighborin g cou11 tries or 
become internally displaced. Social structures and traditional 
ins titutions, such as the secret socie ties tha t often pe rformed this 
procedure as an initia tion rite, were also underm ined by the war. Wi th 
the civil war ended and traditional societies re-es tablishing themselves 
throughout the country, prac tices such as FGM/ FGC are expected to 
increase again in rural areas for those groups for \vhich it has been a 
significant and importan t rite of passage. 
157 /d. 
15s Id . 
• 
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des troyed during the war. 159 Several smaller su ch schools 
currently exist, with \Nomen spending a weekend at the school to 
undergo the initiation right.1 60 There have also been reports that 
children under the age of three have been initiated. Due to the 
secrecy sworn by the in iti a tors, a cloud of m ystery continues to 
surround it161 
Liberia currentl y does not have an y leg islation in force tha t 
specifically bans the prac tice . Article ll(a) of the 1986 Constitution 
provides tha t " All persons are born equally free and independent 
and have certain na tur a l, inherent and inalien able rights, among 
which are the right of enj oying and defending life and liberty, of 
pursuing cmd mainta ining and security of the person ... . "1(, 2 
Further, Article 11 (b) affirm s that "All persons, irrespec tive of 
ethnic background, race, sex, creed, place of ori gin or politica l 
opinion, are entitled to the fundamental rights and freed om s of the 
individual, subject to such qualifications as provided for in this 
Constitution."163 Additionally, under Section 242 of the Liberian 
Penal Code: 
Any person who m aliciously and unlawfully injures 
another by cutting off or otherwise depriving him of any of 
the members of his body, or in any wise m aims him or any 
part of his body or the members thereof, with intent in so 
doing unlawfully to disfigure him or to diminish his 
physical vigor, is guilty of a felony and punishable by 
imprisonment for no t n1ore than five years .164 
However, there have not been any reported cases of using the 
mayhem provision to prosecute a circumciser or otherwise provide 
remedies to a woman who has been forcefully circumcised.IAS 
Therefore, though a right to be free from the practice of female 
circumcision may be inferred from the fundamenta l rights and 
equali ty provisions of the Liberian Cons titution, and though 
Liberia has a mayhem provision that could technically reach 
159 Id. 
16ll ld. 
161 /d. 
162 C ONST. or TH E R EP . O f' Li BER. ar t. ll (a). 
163 Jd. art. 11 (b). 
164 Liberian Codes of Law of 1956, Vol. III, tit. 27, § 242(1), iu R A HMA N & 
TOUBIA, supra note 141, at "l79. 
165 Sta te Department, Liberia: Report on FGM, supra note 156. 
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fe mal e circum cision, there does no t appear to be an effec tive legal 
infra structur e to respond to fen1c1le circumcision. 
4.2. Fclllale Circunzcision : Inz,ulicntion s iu Intemntiollnl Hwnmz Riglzts 
Loiu166 
The practice of fo rcing wo man to undergo fcmille circumcision 
co ntra venes seve ral of the fundan1ental rights of women respected 
by Liberia. Part iculcul;.', th e practice irnplicates c1 woman' s right to 
health and life; freedom from discrimination, cln d freedom of 
thought. 167 A \voman's right to life an d health, enshrined in the 
Internati onal Covenant for Civil and Political Rights 16S and the 
Intcrn<ltional Covenant for Economic Soc i<ll and Cul tural Rights, 169 
is impinged upon because femal e circ umcision ca.n c<lusc death 
and other health complications.I 7ll A woman's right to equality, 
enshrined under the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of 
Discrimination Against 'vVomen,17 1 is violated because female 
1M' This Section does not seek to prov ide an exha usti ve international-law 
a nal ysis o f fem a le circumcis ion. Rather, it se rves to b riefl y acq uaint the reader 
w ith the problema tic pos itio n of female circumcis io n vvi thin bas ic inte rnational 
human r ights lavv. 
lb7 F'ACKER, ~upm n o te 139, at 59. 
l bK lCCPR, supra note 97 (access ion by Liberia on Sept. 22, 200-±) . With respect 
to Lesotho, Senegal, and Tcl nzani a, th e Hum <:ln Rights Commit tee (" HRC'), w hich 
monitors !CCPR implementa tion, has condemned female genita l c ircumcision as a 
pra
c
tice that breaches the rights to life (ar ticle 6) and freedom from cru el, 
inh uman. and degrading treat ment (a rticle 7), d es pit e th cultura l significa nce of 
thi s p ractice in certain socie ties . SARi\ I-I jOS EPH ET AL., T! IE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENAN T ON CIVIL AND POLlTICAL. RICHTS : CAS ES, Jv!ATERIAL.S, AND COMMENTAR Y 
26 (2000). Further, the HRC h as interpreted the right to li fe in the context of 
female circumc is ion as encompassing a duty to prevent and punish pri va te actors. 
fd. at 130. 
I W lnternatio ncll Covenant on Eco nomic, Social and Cultura l Rights art. 12(1), 
ope11cd(or sigunturc Dec. 16, 196 6, 993 UNT.S 3, 6 LL. f\1!. 368 (access ion by Liberia 
on Sept 22, 2004) [herein after ICESCR]. 
11n Fo r a di scussion on the d etrin1ent al hea lth effec ts of female c irc umcisio n, 
see World H ea lth Organiza tion, f-feoltl i Risk::: oud Co uscq ueuces c1-Female Gcuiln! 
Muti!otiou, http: / jwww.who.int/ reproduct ive-hea lth / fgm / im pact.htm (last 
visited Apr. 1"1, 2009) (discussing the detrim ental effects that fema le ci rcumcision 
has on female h e<1lth); World Health Organiza tion , Fe 11111ic Gcllitn! lv1utilntion oud 
0/Js/elric Outco111c: VVHO Co!lobomtiue Pwspcctiuc Study 111 Six A.fricon 
Cou 
u tries 
(2006), http:// WW\"v·.who. in t/ reproductive-hea I th / pub! ications/ articies 
/lancetfgm .pdf (discuss ing the Obstetric d ifficu lties caused by FCM); NA!-IID 
TOUB IA, Cc\1\I NC FOR WO.viEN ITH CIP.CU!\ IC I S I0~-1 : A TECHNICA L. i\i[ANUAL. FOR 
H EALTH CAR E PROVID ER S (1999) (discussing how hea lth ca re providers can manage 
the physical complications of female circumcision). 
17 1 See CEDAW, supm 98 (accession by Liberia on Aug. 16, 1984) . 
• 
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orcuntc1S1on targets women only, <l ttributing to then! an inferior 
statu s. 172 Further, female circumcision serves to keep women in a 
subordina ted position.173 Because women arc often deprived of a 
meaningful, informed choice in undergoing female circumcision, 
and a re bound by cultural norrns that promote the practice, a 
woman's freedom of thou ght is also violated.l 7-r 
Further more, und er CEDAW, the prac tice of forcing a worna n 
to undergo femal e circumcision con travenes the principle tha t s tate 
parties shall seek " to nwdify the social and cultural p<1 ttern s of 
conduc t of men and women, w ith a vievv to achiev ing the 
elimination of prejudices and customary and a ll other practices 
which are based on the idea of the infer iority or the superiority of 
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for rnen an d vvomen." 175 
The Conventi on on the Rights of the Chil d has a sirnilar provision, 
s tipulating that "State Parties sh all take all effec tive and 
appropriate measures with a view to cl bolishin g trc1d itio nal 
prac tices prejudicial to the health of childr en. " 17" Female 
ciretlmC!SlOn's contravention of. fundam ental human rights 
principles is further evidenced by Protocol To The African Charter 
On Human And Peoples' Rights On The Rights Of Women In 
Africa, signed by Liberia, which requires states to eliminate 
harmful cultural practices, including female circumcisio n. 177 
Therefore, given that various provisions of international human 
rights law are implicated in the female circumcision debate, it is 
natural to assume that an international human rights approach 
might be one obvious method to help curtail the practice.17S 
However, an analysis of the political and judicial costs in the 
112 P.-\CK ET\, :=;upm note 139, at 61-62. 
1/ 3 !d. 
174 /d.a t 75. 
173 CEDAW , suprn no te 98, art. 5 (a). 
17t , Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 24(3), opcncd{t>r stgnaturc N ov. 
20, 1989,1577 U N.T.S . 3 (accession by Liberia on July 4, 1993) (hereinafter CRC] . 
177 Protocol to the Afri can C har ter on Hu ma n and Peoples' Ri ghts on the 
Ri g hts of Wo men in Africa, July 11, 2003, ami/nlJ/c ill http:/ jwww ach pr.or g 
/en gl ish / _infojwomen_en .h tml. Liber ia ratified the Protocol in :WOS. 
17t' See '\CI IC mli!f Elizabe th fVIeeh::m, Huu uu1 Rir;;i1ts ilil d lNouu.' Ji ·,; FUc,;llls: Tile 
Appeal to mt Intemt~tional Agendn in the Pro111otion i:;- l!Vcllllt'ii,S Equal Citiz~nship, in 
]UDCES , TRAN SITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, sup m note 61, 2t 479-8 () (noting that the 
"human righ ts agend a has becom e used ex tensive ly by women's movements" 
because of " fru strati on with inadequate d omestic policy or an absence altogeth er 
of attention at this level to issues of gender equali tv ... . "). 
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context of female circumCision in Liberia revea ls that an 
interna tional hum an righ ts approach should be avoided. 
4.3. Tlze llltemational Human Rights Approach to Comba t Fenznl e 
Circumcision 11 Liberia: A Politically and Judi cially Costly 
Endeavor 
In Liberia, an in te rn ational human rights approach that seeks to 
directly import uni versal human rights norms in the female 
circumcision deba te will likely be a politica11y and judicially cos tly 
exercise, relative to its benefits. Liberia is just emerging fron1 a 
brutal civil war; therefore its democratic infrastructure is in its 
nascent stage. Fur thermore, ferTtale circumcision, if not w idely 
practiced, is w idely acknowledged as a permitted cultural practice . 
These conditions impact the cost-benefit analys is of the 
international human rights approach in combating female 
circumcision in Liberia . 
4 . .3 .1. Politiml Cos ts Out·weigh Politica l Benefits in Combating 
Fenwlc Circumcision in Liberia 
Liberia held its first presidential election since the end of its 
fourteen-year civil war in 2005.179 Prior to the election, Liberian 
politics were charac terized by the brutal, extrac tionist politics of 
Charles Taylor and others .1so Liberian political institutions are 
young and political actors are just beginning to develop their 
constituencies.1s1 Given the sensitivities surrounding a prevalent 
harmful traditional practice like female circumcision, utilizing an 
international human rights approach to combat the practice will 
likely be politica lly costly and potentially a drain of political 
179 Q&A: Liberia's Election, BBC N n vs, Nov. 11, 2005, http:/ / news.bbc.co.uk 
/ 2/ hi/africa / 4427932.stm (las t v isited Apr. 9, 2009). 
1so For a history of m odern Liberia, see generally Adekeye Adeba jo, Liberia: A 
Wa rlord's Peace, iu ENDING CIVIL WARS: THE liv!PLEMENTATION OF P EAC E ACREE!v !ENTS 
399, 601- 603 (Stephen John Stedman, Donald Ro thchild & Elizabe th M . Cousens, 
eels. 2002) (describing the ca uses of Liberia's civil war); CARL PATRICK BUR ROWES, 
POWER & PI\ESS Fr\EEDOM IN LIBERIA, 1830-1970 , 259- 72 (2004) (describing abuses of 
power with res pect to freedom of expression in Liberia); M.ARTIN LOWENKOPF, 
POLITICS IN LIBEE!
A: 
TH E CONSERVATIVE ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT (1976) (providing a 
hi story of Liberia to the end of Pres ident Tubman's tenure). 
181 Sec, e.g., Internationa l Crisis Group, Liberia: Staying Focused, Africa Briefin g 
N. 36, Jan. 13, 2006 (desc ribing the ch a llenges to Liberia 's new democracy); see also 
International Crisis Gro up, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, A frica 
Brie fing N. 87, D ec. 8, 2004 (describing the challenges to resurrecting Liberia from 
its former failed sta te s tatus). 
, .~1 
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capitaJ 1 82 For example, in his senate confirmation hearing in 2006, 
then - Minister of Internal Affa irs-designate Ambulai Johnson 
s tated, " [t]hose expatria tes w ho are campaigning against the 
practice of female genital mutilation are ignorant to the matter and 
need to be educated about the practice." 1S3 H e further promised 
the Liberian Senate tha t he would not seek to comba t female 
circum cision .1S4 While Mirtister Johnson's views are not n ecessarily 
indica ti ve of a general sentiment tovvard fem ale circum cision, his 
p ublic statements testify to the p olitical contentiousness of the 
subject. By importing a Wes tern normati ve process to the policy 
debate, opponents of female circumcision will likely increase the 
chances of alienating constituents who are not opposed to the 
practice. Further, an international human ri ghts approach will 
likely hard en the positions of those who share Minis ter Jolmson ' s 
sentiments, in that a human rights approach will smack of an 
unedu cated, foreign force imposing its own normative biases on a 
cultural practice in Liberia . 
The cos ts of alienating dom estic constituents through an 
international human rights discourse also have implica tions in 
implementing international law in Liberia. Under the Liberian 
Constitution, the Legislature, consis ting of a Sen ate and a House of 
Representatives, h as the power "to approve treaties, conventions, 
and such other international agreements nego tiated or signed on 
behalf of the Republic" 185 and to "establish various categories of 
criminal offenses and provide for punishment thereo£." 186 Further, 
the President has the p ower to "conclude treaties, conventions, and 
similar international agreem ents with the concurrence of a majority 
of each House of the Legislatur e."1S7 Thus, international law 
cann ot simply be adopted silently wi thou t policy discussion, and 
political actors need to take affirmative steps to implement the 
JS2 See Becke r, supm note 106, a t 1151-52 (d escribing the impac t of interes t 
groups on political cost-benefit analysis). 
183 Edward Dosa -Wea Neufville, Fe111nle Genital Mutilation: Prcse ruation ol 
Tmditiou at tlze Expense o{ Wo111en '~ Healtlz ?, TH E DAILY OBSERVER, Feb. 13, 2006, 
ava ilable at http:/ /'"-'w w. liberianobser ver.com/news/ print page .php/ aid/ 1915 
/Female_ Gen i tal_l'v! uti Ia tion:_Preserva tion_of_ Trad i tion_a t_the_Ex pense_of 
Women' s_H eal th_. h tml. 
IS~ /(/. 
185 CONST. OFTH E REP. OF LIBER. art. 34(b). 
JoG Id. art. 34(£). 
187 Id. art. 57. 
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vrov1s1ons of international human rights law.188 Doing so to 
1 L/ l...! 
combat female circumcision will further expose political actors to 
accusations of being detached from their constituents. Moreover, 
given the contentiousness of the female circumcision debate, 
political actors will not want to posture themselves as helpless and 
compelled in the face of international norms. 1 ~'9 
While the international human rights appro<:Kh imports an 
international conmmnity of support, the visible presence of the 
international cotTtmunity in combating female circumcision may 
not be beneficial; in fact it may be counterprocluctive. 190 The 
international conmnmity necessarily adopts "the language of 
human rights to protect women's interests." 191 The universalist 
language of the international hum.an rights discourse, attached to 
an international comnnmity of NCOs and donor agencies that a 
political actor may wish to utilize, presents the same difficulty of 
alienating constituencies.192 The message, therefore, is not 
necessarily tailored for its target groups.193 This is not to say that 
international civil society should not be used to confront female 
circumcision, but rather, that their presence would need to be 
subtle in order to avoid introducing cultural relativism debates 
into the mix. One Human Rights Watch report noted: "Our 
colleagues from countries where F.G.M. [female genital mutilation] 
1ss Sec e.g., Dauis u. Republic, (1862) 1 L.LR. 17, 17 (SC) (Liber) ("[W]hich 
treaties are la\,,s when confirmed by the Legislature, are bona fide subjects of this 
state, and the political authority of the same covers them in all of their relations."). 
The requirement of implementing legislation is further suggested by Amnesty 
International's call for Liberia to enact implementing legislation for the Rome 
Statute. Sec Amnesty Int'l, Irztcnwtional Criminal Court: Burundi and Liberia-
Ratifimtion is tlll Important Commitment Towards Endi1zg Impunity, lOR 51/010/2004, 
Sept. 23, 2004, nuailablc at http:/ /vvww.amnesty.ca/resource_centre/news 
/view. php?load =arcview&article=1874&c= Resource+ Centre+ News (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2009) (noting the need for domestic implenwnting legislation to effectuate 
the Rome Stc1tute in Liberia). 
UN Sec supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (describing the political costs 
of implementing international law). 
1911 Sec A.M. Rosenthal, On !vfl; Mind: Fcnznlc Genital Mutilation, NY TIMES, Dec. 
24, 1994, at A27 (describing h~w internationalized efforts to combat female 
circumcision may be counterproductive). 
191 Renu Mandhane, Tlze Usc of Fiuman Riglzts Discourse to Secure !No111C11's 
Interests: 1\ Critical Analysis or the Implications, 10 MICH.]. GENDER & L. 275, 314 
(2004). 
192 See suprn notes 57-59 and accompanying text (describing the alienating 
effects of western values in the Arab Development Report). 
193 Sec supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text (describing how domestic 
support bases, or the lack thereof, affect the international human rights approach). 
....'::51,1 ., 
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is vvidely practiced hav e ad vised u s tha t they should be on the 
front line of efforts to comba t F.G.M., an d a 1nore overt role by 
Huma n Rights Watch at thi s time could be counterproductive to 
local effor ts." 19 1 
In addition, the internation al hun1 an rights discourse w ill n ot 
fully target the underlying problems C\ssoc[ated with female 
cirnmK is ion, and as a result, political ac tors may find that the 
internationa l hurnan rights approach w ill only flaccidly respond to 
the prob lem. International human rights laH' d oes n ot "cr iticall y 
analyz[e
j 
the u nderlying sys tem that has crectted th e violations."I 9S 
Moreover, legis la tive efforts to com bel t fe male circumcision in 
Liberi a, g iven the prominence of the prac tice, may be counter-
productive in and of themselves, eithe r by d riving the prac tice 
underground or erteouragin g mass-scale circunK isions before the 
lavv goes into effec t. 196 Therefore, politica l actors may find tha t 
explicit reliance on an interna tional human rights approach not 
only al ienates them fro m their constituencies, but also proves to be 
an ine ffec tive tool. 
4.3.2. Judicial Costs Outweigh the ]wiicinl BcJLejits ofCombnting 
Fe ma
le 
Ci rcumcis ion in Liberial 91 
Judicia l actors198 also have reasons to hesita te in direc tly 
incorporating international human rights law to combat female 
1 9~ Rosenthal, supm note 190 (qu oting a Huma n Rig hts Watch report). 
195 ivland han c, suprn note 191, at 320. 
1% Sec U.S.A.I.D. Bureau for Africa, Office o f Sus tainable Development, AFR. 
VOICES NEWSL ETTER, Summer 1997, a t 4 ("Alth ough supportin g legislation for 
criminal punishment of such practices might be effec tive too ls fo r preventing 
FGM, in coun tries w here large m ajo riti es believe in and adhere to these traditio nal 
practices, leg al sanctions incriminating providers mi g ht prove counterproducti ve . 
For examp le, when a p residentia l d ec ree in l<e nya prohibited FGrvl, severa l 
hundred young girl s were immediately circumcised as a result. "). 
:97 This Section onl y refers to Li berian statuto ry courts contemplated by the 
Libe ri a n Cons titution, not the cus to mary la w svstem and its assoc ia ted courts . See 
] Er\:-JFTTE E. C.-\R T FR & j OYCE IvlENDS-COLE, LIBERI A:\ Wc)\I EN : THEIR Rou IN Fooo 
PPODUCTION AN D TH E!R [DUCAT ION. '\ 1_ A.ND LEG.".L 5T f\ TUS 157-82 (1982) (expla ining 
the cus tomary and statutorv legal sys tem s in Liberi i:i ). 
t tJS One seriou s h ind rance that inhibits r<>tio ni.ll discu ss ion o f a putative 
Liberia n jud ge's th ought process co ncernin g int ernati o na l hum a n righ ts la w is the 
fact that the Liberian jud iciary is gene rall y acknowl ed ged to be weak a nd corrupt. 
Sec, e.g., International Crisis Group, Lil1eria: R.esurrcc tins !lie Ju stice System, Africa 
Briefing N. 7, Apr. 6, 2006 (describing the terrible state of the jus tice system and 
recommending reforms) . This section, however, does not fac tor corruption into 
the ana lys is. 
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circumCision. Article 65 of the Liberian Cons titution provides that 
"courts shall apply both s ta tutory and common laws in accordance 
with the standards enacted by the Leg isla ture."ILJ<J Nowhere in the 
articles describing judicial power does the Liberian Constitution 
explicitly authorize its courts to consult interna tional la w . Rather, 
provisions rela ted to international law are co nfined to those 
sections within the Liberian Constitutio11 definin g executive and 
legisla tive po wer. 200 As a result, judges, who are appointed in 
Liberia and can only be removed for certain prescribed reaso ns/01 
may fear attacks of transcending the separation of powers by 
overstepping the plain language of their judicial grant of power. Tf 
legislatures have not themselves enacted provisions of 
interna tional h uman rights lavv, or if Liberian common la w d oes 
not automatically incorpora te international la vv, then the judicial 
branch woul d be hard-pressed to find constituti on al authority to 
incorporate these provisions. While this limita tion does not 
preclude referencing the persuasive authority of interna ti onal 
hum.an rights law, judges would likely proceed down such a path 
with a high degree of caution, if they were concerned about 
preserving the separation of powers or opening themselves to 
attacks of inappropriately borrowing from outside legal 
traditions.202 
199 CONST. OF THE REP. OF L!l3ER. art. 65. 
2oo /d. art . 34(b) ("The Legisla ture sha ll have the power ... to approve trea ties, 
conventions and such other inte rnationa l agreements negotia ted or signed on 
behalf of the Repu bli c."); id. ar t. 57 ("The President shall have the power to 
conduct the foreign affairs of the Republic and in that connection he is 
empowered to conclude trea ties, convent ions and similar international 
agreements w ith the concurrence of a majority of each H ouse of the Legis latur e."); 
see a/5o Hanatu Kabbah, A Guide to tlze Liberian Lega l Syste111 n11d Legal Resea rch , at 6 
ht tp/ jwww nyulawglobal.org/globalex/ Liberia.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) 
("Internationa l trea ties signed and ratified by the State of Liberia have to be 
d omesticated for them to have the force of law in the country. This means that in 
order to become par t of the nationa l legal sys tem or order, international trea ties 
have to be approved and adopted by the leg islatur e.") . 
201 CONST
. 
OF THE REP. OF L!BER. art. 71 ("The Chief justice and the Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court and the judges of subordinate cou rts of record shall 
hold office during good behavior. They may be removed upon impeachment and 
conviction bv the Legislature based on proved miscondu ct, gross breach of duty, 
inability to perform the functions of their offi ce, or conv iction in a court of law fo r 
treason, bribery or other infamous crimes .") 
102 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (describing hovv separation 
of powers concern affec t the judicial calculation of using an international human 
rights approach). 
1 
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Even if judicial ac tors were prepared to tinker wi th the 
separa tion of po wers embod ied in Liberia's consti tution, judges, 
like political actors in Liberia, ma y fea r imposing an international 
human rights standard ove r "accep ted" national values. Given 
that there is not a s trong na tional movement to eradicate female 
circumcision in Liberia, and that m.any communities continue the 
practice, judges may be hesitant to chall enge these na tion al values 
by incor por<:lting international hum an rights law to combat fen1a le 
circumcision.2o3 
Finally, even if judges were prepared to open themselves to 
cr itiqu es of viola ting the separations of powers and ignori ng 
national va lues, international human rights law would be an 
ineffec tive agent for change. As m entioned prev iously, 
interna tional human rights law does no t speak to the 
socioeconornic and cultural conditions that permit female 
circumcision to happen.204 Further, political agents and local 
leaders may avoid complying 1vith any such judicial decision tha t 
uses international human rights law to combat female 
circumCisiOn. Therefore, given the significant costs and meager 
benefits of using international human rights to combat female 
circumcision, judicial ac tors would be ill-advised to take on such 
an approach . 
4.4. Oth er Po ten tia l Ave nues to Su ccessfully Combat Fenwle 
Circumcision in Liberia 
That an international human rights approach is a politically 
and judicially costly way of combating female circumcision of 
course does not imply that advocates cannot effec tively comba t 
fem ale circumcis ion. A report by the Department of Women's 
Health Systems and Community H ea lth of the World H ealth 
Organization documented effec ti ve strategies to help comba t 
female circu mcision.205 In Egyp t, for example, The Coptic 
Evangelical Organiza tion for Social Services in Egypt ("CEOSS") 
sends in "programme implement ers" who work in concert wi th 
203 Sec 511pm notes 67- 69 and accompanyi ng text (descri bing how national 
va lues affec t the judicial calcul a ti on of using an international human rights 
approach). 
20.J See supm Section 4.2. 
205 World Heal th Organ i:z:ation, Dept. of Women's Health, Health Sys. and 
Cmty. Health, Female Genital Mutilation, Prog rammes to D te: What W orks and What 
Doesn't, WHO/CHS/WMH/99.5 (1999) . 
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local leaders.2or, CEOSS p rogra mme imp len1ente rs " register[] the 
number of girls between the ages of 7 and 13 who are at ri sk of 
being excised, as w ell as gradually introducing iss ues pertaining to 
health and literacy, follovved by the sensiti ve topic of FCM." 2o;: 
Then, comrnunity leaders, each responsible for girls at risk of being 
excised in their respective geographic area, monitor the girls and 
disseminate information on the negative consequ ences of female 
circum cisior1.208 The Mand eleo Ya Wanawake Organization 
("MYWO") in Kenya has implemen ted an "Alternative Coming of 
Age Progran1.me," whereby MYWO wo rks with community 
leaders to develop an "alternative ritual that is acceptable to all the 
stakeholders (girls, fathers, comm.unity members)." 209 In Senegal, 
Tostan developed com munity-based, ed uca tional strategies to 
encourage loca l leaders to pledge aga inst prac ticing female 
circumc1s1on . After several tra ining sess ions, "village women, 
when learning about the negative hea lth conseq uences, decided 
independently to ac t to end FGM in their v i1lages ."21D According to 
Tostan, half the fema le communities in Senegal that practiced 
female circumcision have abandoned the practice, in part because 
of Tostan's "respectful approach that allows villagers to make their 
own conclusions about FCC and to lead their own movements for 
change." 211 Furthermore, none of these programs explicitly uses an 
international human rights approach or discourse in their anti-
female circumosJon campaigns, even if the organiza tions 
themselves 've re motivated by human rights nonns. 
In Liberia, community-based can1paigns such as those 
employed in Egypt, Kenya, and Senegal would be an effective 
means to initiate discussions about the negative consequences of 
female circumcision. Such approaches need not incorporate an 
international human rights discourse to fulfill Liberia's 
interna tional human rights obligations under CEDAW, ICCP K the 
CRC or the African human rights instruments. In. fact there is 
evidence that policymakers are employing these community-based 
approaches. Recently, UNJCEF in Liberia applauded the use of a 
206 hi. at 105. 
207 Id. 
2os Td. 
209 Id. at 107. 
210 Id. at 113. 
211 Tostan, Abandoning Fe111nle Genital Cutting, http://www. tos tan.orgjweb 
jpage/586/ sectionid/547 / pageleve l/3/ interior.asp (las t visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
"l1 
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non-coercive and non-judgn1 ental approach" to "rais[ e] 
avvareness in the community about the harmfulness of the practice, 
... encourag[e] public declarations of the collective com.mitment to 
aband onment," and "spread the abando nment message withi n 
co mn1tmi ties ." 21 2 
4.5. S u nzn wry 
An international hun1an rights approach is judicially and 
politically costly, relative to its benefits, in combating female 
circumcision in Liberia.. Feme-de circumcision is a. prevalent 
practi ce within Liberia, a country whose d enwcratic institutions 
are nascent, and whose politica l actors are developing their 
constituencies. Taking on the cztse against fe male circumcision, 
and us ing an international human rights approach to do so, w ill 
likely alienate politicians form their cons tituents. The potential 
political benefits, moreover, are meager; the presence of 
international assis tance vvould need to minimized, and the 
international legal corpus is not competent to address the 
underlying structural conditions of female circumcision. For 
judges, using international human rights law would contravene 
separation of powers under the Liberian Constitution; further, 
judges, relatively unfamiliar with international law, might fear 
s tepping on national values through incorporating human rights 
law . This, of course, is not to say that eradication efforts will not be 
successful in Liberia . Rather, approaches such as those used in 
Egypt, Kenya and Senegal revea 1 that respectful, con1.munity-based 
educational campaigns that do not rely on an international human 
rights approach are the mos t effective means to combat female 
CirCU mclSlOll. 
5. CONCLUSION 
International human rights norms are universal. However, the 
process for implementing these norms is not. Because the process 
of explicitly implementing international human rights law imports 
a set of costs and benefits for the political and judicial ac tors 
considering its use, advocates who wish to confront culturally 
grounded human rights abu ses must consider whether the toolkit 
212 UNICEF Hails Progress Agai11sl Female Genital Cutti11g, TH E D l'dLY OBSERVER, 
Feb. 12, 2006, nuai/able nt http:/ jwwvv.liberianobserver.com/news/fullstory.php 
j aid / 1896/ UN ICEF _Hails_Progress_Against_Female_ Geni tal_ Cutting.html. 
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of international human rights law ought to be utilized. In cases 
like Turkey, don1estic conditions amplify the benefits and 
minimize the costs of using an international human rights 
approach. In cases like Liberia, domestic conditions make the 
international human rights approach a costly endeavor relative to 
its potential benefits; advocacy approaches in Liberia need not 
employ international human rights law, and should instead rely on 
targeted strategies that do not import the normative biases that 
human rights law implies. 
Politicians, judges and international hurnan rights advocates 
that hope to eradicate culturally grounded human rights abuses 
must, therefore, be sensitive to tl1e costs and benefits associated 
with an international human rights approach, and proceed 
accordingly. 
.,~1· 
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